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Federal Labor Relations: A Program in Transition
Daniel Matthews*
In January'1962, one hundred and thirty years after federal employees' unions
first appeared, a presidential order authorized a limited form of collective
bargaining. Prior to this date federal union membership had slowly grown over
the years and was particularly widespread in the postal service. There were also
two large service-wide unions' for classified employees, the American Federa-
tion of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) and the National Federation of
Government Employees (Ind.). In addition, blue collar employees were heavily
represented by various craft unions.
The right of federal employees to join unions had first been established by
Congress in 1912. Having learned early in their existence that Congress was
the source of basic employee benefits, the unions had directed most of their
energies toward developing congressional relationships and their officials had
become skilled lobbyists for employee benefits legislation. The unions repre-
senting classified employees had a heterogeneous membership often extending
into management ranks. Emphasis was placed on cooperation and attention
was given to consultative activity especially with officials of the Civil Service
Commission. Considerable time was spent in the handling of grievances. As
late as 1961 the situation was reminiscent of the 1920's period of employer-
sponsored employee representation plans in private industry., Two agencies,
the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Department of Interior, engaged in
collective bargaining. Approximately 19,000 of their employees were repre-
sented in bargaining units.'
Consequently, granting federal employees the right to bargain collectively,
no matter how limited in scope, was recognized as epochal. The Executive
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I. The Task Force, appointed by President Kennedy, in its 1961 report, noted that unionization
of Federal employees had followed the pattern of private industry; in 1960, some 33 percent of
federal employees, totalling 762,000 persons including 489,224 in the Post Office Department,
belonged to employee organizations, whereas 32.4 percent of nonagricultural workers, in the
private sector, belonged to unions. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE
FEDERAL SERVICE (1961).
2. Id.
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Order was hailed as a "magna carta" for federal employees and proved to be
the catalyst for a union-organizing explosion. By November 1970, 58 percent
of the federal work force was represented in 2,426 exclusive units.
With the passing of the initial stages of organizing, the unions turned to
negotiating and within a few short years were disillusioned by such factors as
their lack of bargaining power, the limited subject matter on which they could
bargain, the absence of central administration, the non-availability of neutral
third-party tribunals for impasse resolution, unfair labor practice complaints,
and arbitration of disputes and grievances.' Federal administrators reluctantly
recognized that the pronounced weaknesses in the Order threatened stable
labor-management relations and Executive Order No. 11,491 was issued by
President Nixon on October 29, 1969.1
The new Order was the outgrowth of study and committee work spanning
two administrations and is based on the 1969 Report and Recommendations
on Labor-Management Relations on the Federal Service.' The Report was
issued by a study committee consisting of the Secretary of Defense, the Secre-
tary of Labor, the Postmaster General, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, and the Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. The princi-
pals had changed, but in 1967 incumbents of the same positions had been
designated as members of a Presidential Committee to conduct hearings and
make findings and recommendations regarding the operation of the Federal
Labor management program.'
The work of the first Committee was made public only in draft form, as an
attachment to the Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, dated January 16,
1969.7 The final report and Executive Order No. 11,491 depended on the sub-
stance of the draft report. But the new Order and Report also reflected addi-
tional work on the part of a new set of officials representing a different adminis-
tration. The few major differences in the reports seemed to reflect a change in
philosophy and a belief in the need for a more firm management attitude.'
3. See Remarks of Otto Pragan, Assistant Director, AFL-CIO Education Department, 20
GOV'T EMPLOYEES REL. REP. C-1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1964) [hereinafter cited as G.E.R.R.].
4. 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, October 31, 1969.
5. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11,491 [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT].
6. President Lyndon B. Johnson, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPART-
MENTS AND AGENCIES (Sept. 8, 1967).
7. FIFTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ATTACHMENT "B", Jan. 16,
1969 [hereinafter cited as DRAFT REPORT or WIRTZ COMMITTEE REPORT]. See REPORT OF
PRESIDENT'S REVIEW COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE, 280 G.E.R.R. (Special Supp. Jan. 20, 1969) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE].
8. See Remarks of Harold S. Roberts to Industrial Management Club of Oahu, 327 G.E.R.R.
E-i (Dec. 15, 1969).
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Executive Order No. 11,491 was responsive to the testimony proffered by
both labor and management representatives.' Some sections clearly reflected
the impact of experiences of state and local bodies and points of view expressed
by experts in the field.'" The Order appeared to be a document that would make
collective bargaining for federal employees a viable institutional process.", But
union leaders were restrained in their praise, vigorous in their criticism of
sections which ran counter to their particular interests, and somewhat skeptical
of the future course of the program.'
Unfortunately the new Order had issued too late. For more than two years
prior to the hearings conducted by the President's Review Committee in Octo-
ber 1967, labor had called vigorously for fundamental changes in federal labor
relations. At the hearings, its representatives repeated in detail the changes they
deemed necessary to achieve a climate for stable labor-management relations.
Yet another two years passed before the Order was issued. In this period,
employee militancy increased, inflation eroded pay raises, and the salaries of
top executives and legislators were significantly increased. Furthermore, state,
county, and municipal employees had demonstrated that illegal strikes could
bring about employee benefits-and overall the federal government had not
been a responsive employer.
This employee unrest was reflected in a series of events in 1970 which threat-
ened to make the new order obsolete. In March, an illegal strike of postal
employees at local levels crippled the operations of metropolitan mail centers
throughout the country. No legal or disciplinary action was taken against the
unions, their leaders, or employees participating in the strike. On the contrary,
negotiations were held with federal officials and indirectly with the Congress
itself. A general pay raise, retroactive to December 1969, was enacted into law.
Also, agreement was reached for legislation to transform the Department into
an independent government organization, to provide an additional eight per-
cent pay increase, and to institute a collective bargaining system for establish-
ing wages, hours, and working conditions, with impasses being subject to bind-
9. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FED-
ERAL SERVICE 1967-1968, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS, Oct. 23-27, 1967, Department of Labor
[hereinafter cited as TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS].
10. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7. The Review Committee of 1967 had
the services of an Advisory Panel composed of labor-relations specialists and educators.
II. Robert E. Hampton, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, expressed a view that the Order
established a framework and procedure for broadened collective bargaining in the federal govern-
ment. Address by Robert Hampton to Fed. Bar Ass'n Briefing Conference on Exec. Order No.
11.491, Jan. 19, 1970.
12. James H. Rademacher, President, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO
found in the Order a ". . . harder line towards federal government employees and their unions as
compared to the official policy for the previous seven years and nine months..." 324 G.E.R.R.
F-I (Nov. 24, 1967). George Meany, President, AFL-CIO called the Order an important step
forward, but noted that there were some areas only partially improved and others not improved
at all. 332 G.E.R.R. A-5 (Jan. 19, 1970).
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ing arbitration. These proposals became law in August 1970.11
However, unions representing classified employees were not as successful.
For example, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO),
which represents air traffic controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration,
initiated a "sick out" in March 1970. The Departments of Justice and Trans-
portation began legal action and rival unions attacked PATCO through pro-
cesses available under the Executive Order. The "sick out" was ineffective and
both the union and employees suffered penalties."
The pragmatic attitude of the government and the firm handling of the air
controller "sick out" appeared to relieve the crisis atmosphere and provide an
opportunity for implementation of the new Order. 5 There is also little doubt
that the enactment of true collective bargaining legislation for postal employ-
ees, while providing a long range goal for classified and blue collar employees,
actually lightened the responsibilities of those administering labor relations
under Executive Order No. 11,491.
In signing Executive Order No. 11,491, President Nixon had directed that a
review and assessment of operations under the Order be made after one year.
Public hearings for this purpose were held in October 1970. Executive Order
No. 11,616, amending Executive Order No. 11,491, and an accompanying
report were issued on August 26, 1971.16
With few exceptions, the amendments consisted of changes directed toward
improving the administrative processes under the Order. Union spokesmen
considered the amendments inadequate. 7 At this time, after a decade of collec-
tive bargaining within a framework established by Executive Order, labor is
firmly committed to seeking legislation to replace the present system. 8
13. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (Aug. 12, 1970).
14. 370 G.E.R.R. G-I (Oct. 12, 1970). In an action consolidating a representation petition by
PATCO and an unfair labor charge against PATCO, a Department of Labor Hearing Examiner
found that PATCO was not a labor organization under Section 2(e), Executive Order No. 11,491
because it has participated in and condoned a work stoppage. It was also found that PATCO had
violated Section 19(b)(4) of the Order by participating in and condoning a work stoppage. The
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations accepted and modified the findings
of the Hearing Examiner. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIGEST AND INDEX OF PUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, PURSUANT TO EXECU-
TIVE ORDER No. 11,491, As AMENDED 131 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST AND INDEX]. 376
G.E.R.R. A-3 (Nov. 23, 1970) reported 56 Air Controllers had been fired and 2,000 suspended.
15. See, e.g., Lydon, Fed. Unions Seem to be Calm, New York Times, May 17, 1970, at 92,
col. 1. ". . . [Tihe 'militancy' of Federal Government workers is in the eye of the beholder and
the 'strike fever' that many people worried about seems non-existent."
16. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIO.NS ON LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE-Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,616 of Aug. 26, 1971 [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL REPORT].
17. 417 G.E.R.R. A-12 (Sept. 6, 1971).
18. 389 G.E.R.R. A-13 (Feb. 22, 1971). The AFL-CIO Executive Council places the attaining
of a Labor-Management Act replacing Executive Order No. 11,491 as its first priority.
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Among professional observers, there is considerable support for the union
position. 9 The administration viewpoint, as expressed by Civil Service Com-
mission Chairman Robert E. Hampton, is that there is no objection in principle
to labor relations legislation but that the time is not yet ripe.'" Thus there seems
to be little dispute as to the need for legislation dealing with labor-management
relations. The questions concern the content and timing of such legislation.
This article assumes that the process of collective bargaining has been ac-
cepted as necessary and appropriate in the scheme of federal personnel man-
agement. It is intended to review the federal labor-management relations scene,
including the development of Executive Order No. 10,988, the problems en-
countered in the administration of the program under that Order, the signifi-
cant improvement achieved through Executive Order No. 11,491, and the
changes made by Executive Order No. 11,616.
This review leads the writer to conclude that the Executive Branch has
developed a sound procedural framework for labor-management relations with
its own employees; but it is also concluded that the program is inherently
limited in substance, because of the management authority retained by Con-
gress and the natural reluctance of the Executive Branch to allow its manage-
ment powers to be subject to collective bargaining. Stable labor-relations re-
quire an impartial body or bodies to administer the program with recourse to
judicial review. These problems demand legislative solution. Consequently,
attention will be given to the substance of labor-management relations legisla-
tion and to the reshaping of government organizations to make it effective.
II. The Executive Orders
Events Leading to Executive Order No. 10,988
As early as 1949, federal employee unions had supported legislation that would
have provided union recognition and established a labor relations sytem for
federal employees. The most prominent of those bills were known as the
Rhodes-Johnston bills, after their sponsors, Congressman George M. Rhodes
and Senator Olin D. Johnston."1
19. See, e.g., 2 ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, COMMITTEE REPORTS 166 (1971).
20. 394 G.E.R.R. A-I (Mar. 29, 1971). Testifying before the House' Post Office and Civil
Service Committee, Chairman Hampton said, "We do not object in principle to legislation in this
area. However, we think it should not come until policies and machinery have been tested and
conditions stabilized sufficiently to know what will be suitable and effective."
21. H.R. 3702, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949); H.R. 554, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951); H.R. 172,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953); H.R. 10237, S. 3593, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955); H.R. 6, 386, 8th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1957); H.R. 6, 95, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959); H.R. 12, S. 473, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess.'(1961).
[Vol. 21:512
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By the mid-fifties leaders of organized labor had joined actively with their
federal brethren in supporting legislation. This was a result of the recognition
that public employees on all levels constituted an untapped source for organiza-
tion. Other respected voices were also calling for change. The Hoover Commis-
sion of 1949 recommended that policies be developed for the participation of
employees in formulating and implementing personnel policies and practices.
In 1955, the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association concluded
that' a government which sponsored a public policy of collective bargaining in
the private sector could not, in good faith, refuse to deal in a similar fashion
with its own public servants."
John F. Kennedy had endorsed the Rhodes-Johnston bill in 1956, as a Sena-
tor. Later, as a candidate for President, he had reaffirmed his endorsement.
With his election in 1960, the stage was set for positive federal action in labor
relations.
In June 1961, the President appointed a Task Force to review employee-
management relations in the federal service and to make findings and recom-
mendations not later than November 30, 1961. The Task Force, with Secretary
of Labor Arthur Goldberg as Chairman and John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman,
U.S. Civil Service Commission as Vice-Chairman, submitted its report in
timely fashion. 3 In summary, the Task Force found that: (1) there was no
uniform federal policy on labor relations-for the most part, federal employee
unions had received limited recognition for limited purposes; (2) unions were
capable of contributing more to the effective conduct of the public business and
the Task Force endorsed the President's view that the public interest called for
a strengthening of employee-management relations within the federal govern-
ment; (3) approximately one-third of federal employees-with the Post Office
employees comprising more than sixty percent of the total-were union mem-
bers; (4) granting that there were similarities between the conditions of private
and public employment, dissimilarities were such that it was neither desirable
nor possible to fashion a federal system of employee-management relations
directly upon the private system-it would be sufficient merely to extend the
operation of the best existing government practices; (5) certain of the ground
rules which Congress had laid down for employee-management relations in the
private sector should be carried over to the federal government in order to
ensure that the interests of both the public and the individual employees would
be protected; (6) and, there need be no conflict between the system proposed
22. W. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 141-70 (1961). W.
VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 45-67 (1966).
Both authors provide an analysis and history of the extended union campaign for favorable legisla-
tion in the years immediately preceding Executive Order No. 10,988.
23. Supra note I.
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and the Civil Service merit system, which should remain the essential basis of
the personnel policy of the federal government.
Based on these findings, a number of recommendations were made. The
Task Force proposed that employee unions should have the right to be recog-
nized by agency management. Because of the nature of government business
and the wide variations in the extent of employee organizations, three forms
of recognition were proposed.
First, when certain conditions were met, the principle of exclusive representa-
tion should be accepted with provisions for limited collective bargaining includ-
ing the execution of written agreements.
Second, the responsibility for administration of the program should be de-
centralized to each Department and Agency. The Civil Service Commission
and the Department of Labor would provide technical assistance. 4
Third, neither a union nor closed shop would be permitted because both
arrangements were contrary to the civil service concept and inappropriate to
the Federal Service.
The Task Force did not accept some proposals by the AFL-CIO such as the
establishment of a central government labor relations panel, the use of the
Federal Mediation Service and binding arbitration to resolve bargaining im-
passes. Nor did it accept the proposals of the National Postal Union (Ind.) and
the National Federation of Federal Employees which spoke against the princi-
ple of exclusive recognition.15
Executive Order No. 10,988
Executive Order No. 10,988 was issued in January 1962. Based on the Task
Force Report, it was a carefully drawn document that provided for the begin-
nings of collective bargaining, yet preserved intact the fundamental sovereign
attributes of the federal establishment." The Order set forth three forms of
recognition, based upon the extent of membership within an appropriate unit.
Informal recognition (some members in unit) granted the right to present views
24. 25 G.E.R.R. A-10 (March 2, 1964). That the Task Force did consider the possibility of a
central administrative authority was indicated in 1964 by H.T. Herrick, a staff member. Mr.
Herrick said, "politically it was not in the cards to establish another agency under the Executive
Order of the President," and that during the drafting period, the Task Force was advised that
agency heads must retain final authority. Therefore, it was "a legal and political reality that things
came out the way they did."
25. U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FED-
ERAL SERVICE, PERSONNEL METHODS SERIES, No. 15, at 3.06 (1962).
26. See President John F. Kennedy, Memorandum of Transmittal, Dec. 4, 1961.
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on matters of concern to its members. Formal recognition (at least 10 percent
membership) granted the right to consultation, and exclusive recognition (10
percent membership and designation as representative by a majority of employ-
ees in the unit) granted the right to negotiate written agreements and the duty
to represent all employees in the unit.
For purposes of exclusive representation, units were to be established on
.. any plant or installation, craft, functional or other basis which will ensure
a clear and identifiable community of interest among the employees concerned,
but no unit shall be established solely on the basis of the extent to which
employees have organized . . . ." Managers and personnel staff were ex-
cluded. Supervisors and the employees whom they supervised were not to be
in the same unit. Professional and non-professional employees were not to be
included in the same unit unless a majority of professionals voted for inclusion.
These concepts and the machinery for unit determination were drawn from the
practices of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in administering the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, with respect to employees in the
private sector."7 Advisory arbitration through the Secretary of Labor was made
available for unit questions and elections at agency expense.
Unions with exclusive recognition had the right to negotiate written agree-
ments, but the subject matter and scope were limited by extensive management
prerogative clauses. Management's obligation to negotiate did not extend to
"the mission of the agency, its budget, its organization and the assignment of
its personnel, or the technology of performing its work."
Executive Order No. 10,988 required that all agreements be approved by the
head of the agency or his designate. The administration of agreements was
"governed by the provisions of any existing or future laws and regulations,
including policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual and agency regula-
tions . . . " Management officials retained the right in accordance with appl-
icable laws and regulations:
(a) to direct employees of the agency, (b) to hire, promote, transfer,
assign and retain employees in positions within the agency, and to
suspend, demote, discharge or take other disciplinary action against
employees, (c) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of
work or other legitimate reasons, (d) to maintain the efficiency of
the Government operations entrusted to them, (e) to determine the
methods, means and personnel by which such operations are to be
conducted, and (f) to take whatever actions may be necessary to
carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency.
27. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act). 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-91 (1947).
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The Order contained no provisions for the arbitration of impasses and gave
employees the right to join or not to join unions, thus barring the union or
agency shop. Both negotiated grievance procedures and advisory arbitration
were authorized, but they were limited to matters concerning the interpretation
or application of agreements or agency policy.
The Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission were assigned
certain responsibilities in assisting the agencies. These included program guid-
ance, technical advice and training, as well as preparation of both standards
of conduct for unions and a code of fair labor practices. A Temporary Commit-
tee was established to implement the Order, advise the President, and report
to him on the standards of conduct and the code of fair labor practices.
In all of its major provisions the Order placed the primary responsibility for
administration on each agency. This approach was continued in 1963 with the
issuance of "Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations" and the
"Code of Fair Labor Practices in the Federal Service."28 Each agency had the
primary responsibility for enforcing both the standards and the
code-including the adjudication of any unfair labor practices it was alleged
to have committed.
Executive Order No. 10,988 legitimatized a limited form of collective bar-
gaining for unions representing federal employees, but it gave these unions no
correlative powers at the bargaining table. Deference to agency powers resulted
in individual grants of authority that were not conducive to the development
of uniform policy and practice throughout the government; it asked of agency
officials a committment beyond enlightened self-interest.29 These officials were
instructed, by the Order, to replace unilateral action with bilateral decision-
making in various personnel practices. At the same time, as the enforcement
authority, they were to review the propriety of their own actions."
Experience Under Executive Order No. 10,988
With the promulgation of the Order, both labor and management immediately
became involved in recruiting, organizing, and training staff for the handling
of representation questions, negotiating agreements, and administering con-
tracts. Except for the expertise available at AFL-CIO headquarters and its
28. President John F. Kennedy, Memorandum to Agency Heads May 21, 1963.
29. Speaking of the reasons for the financial community's dislike of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Stewart Alsop comments, "[b]ut power as well as money was at stake, and more even
than the loss of money, men instinctively resent, and bitterly resist the loss of power." S. ALSOP,
THE CENTER 10 (1968).
30. D. Barr, Executive Order 10988: An Experiment in Employee-Management Cooperation
in the Federal Service, 52 GEO. L.J. 445-49 (1964).
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departments, federal employee unions were not ready for collective bargaining.
They were short of both skills and bodies. However, the unions received a
tremendous financial lift when regulations were issued in 1963 which author-
ized the voluntary withholding of union dues by agencies.
Management had similar problems. There was little labor-management ex-
pertise in the federal personnel staffs. Furthermore, it was imperative to de-
velop and inform supervisors and executives of the philosophy, principles, and
machinery required to implement the Order. The Department of Labor estab-
lished an Office for Labor-Management Relations and made ad hoc arbitrators
available for determining appropriate units and majority status. The Civil
Service Commission established advisory services and programs for training
agency staffs at both regional and headquarters levels. Major departments and
agencies set up extensive "in-house" training programs, often contracting with
outside experts to serve as instructors. 31
Initial problems centered on the determination of appropriate units and the
application of the conflict on interest provisions of the Order. Some agencies,
notably the Department of the Navy, tended to seek the most appropriate unit
and usually determined that it was the installation as a whole. Early arbitra-
tions, relying on NLRB decisions as guides, usually recommended smaller
units.3"
The conflict of interest problem had a twofold origin. The federal-service
type unions, the National Federation of Federal Employees and the American
Federation of Government Employees, as well as some single agency organiza-
tions, such as the National Association of Internal Revenue Employees, had
long included supervisors as members, leaders, and often representatives. Sec-
tion l(b) of Executive Order No. 10,988 prohibited an employee from partici-
pating in the management of a union or acting as its representative when such
participation or activity would result in a conflict of interest or would otherwise
be contrary to law, or with official duties. Section six of the Order excluded
managerial executives from the unit for the purpose of exclusive representation
and also prohibited supervisors and employees supervised by them from being
in the same unit. Implementation of these provisions was a serious threat to
the leadership of the unions mentioned above. Secondly, there were various
interpretations of these two sections by the different agencies, some of which
originally would have placed undue restrictions on union membership.
As negotiations became more prevalent, the unions found that the scope of
bargaining was severely limited by agency interpretation of the management
31. For a more detailed chronicle of these events, see VOSLOO, supra note 22.
32. 5 G.E.R.R. 39 (Oct. 14, 1963).
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rights clauses, the primacy given to agency regulations, and the lack of author-
ity that local managers brought to the bargaining table. The unions also found
that in the absence of the right to strike or to resort to some impartial third
party, they had little or no power to enforce or achieve their bargaining de-
mands."
The implementation of Executive Order No. 10,988 also clarified the man-
agement role of the Civil Service Commission. Prior to the advent of the
collective bargining process, employees and unions had looked upon the Civil
Service Commission as their friend and protector, their representative against
agencies. 4 Under Section 12 of the Order, the Commission openly accepted
its responsibility as the central personnel-management organization of the Ex-
ecutive Branch. In this primary role it was not the impartial protector of the
merit system, but properly a management body. This demarcation of the Com-
mission's management function had at first a traumatic impact on union lead-
ership, but later contributed to a growing sophistication in labor-management
relations. Less notable publicly, the management role of agency personnel
staffs was crystallized in similar fashion.
By 1967, both management and labor recognized that the decentralized pro-
gram had developed serious weaknesses which required correction if a labor-
relations program based on collective bargaining was to endure. Consequently,
extensive hearings were conducted in 1967. Because of personnel changes, and
the 1968 elections, a new order was not issued until October 29, 1969.
Executive Order No. 11,491
The new Order, taken as a whole, represented significant, indeed radical, prog-
ress towards a collective bargaining system. Centralized administration re-
placed agency control of the program; Executive Order No. 11,491 provided
for third-party handling of grievances, disputes, bargaining impasses, represen-
tation questions, and unfair labor practices. There was an attempt to balance
bargaining power, and binding arbitration of impasses was made .possible. The
principal thrust of the Order was to establish a well conceived procedural
framework for the operation of a system of collective bargaining.
The methods used to establish this framework are of interest. No new agency
33. See ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, COMMITTEE REPORTS. These reports
provide annual reviews of the federal programs.
34. HART, supra note 262, at 241, "Many government employees live out their lives without ever
being disabused of the notion that the Civil Service Commission is a benign force created by
Congress to protect them from the perfidies of their bosses. It would be a shock to them to find
that the Commission is nothing but a staff adviser to the boss's bosses."
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was established. Rather, the Order provided that all final decisions in case-
handling or administration would be made by Executive Branch employees.
Thus relations with Congress were not disturbed and questions concerning
improper delegation of authority were foreclosed.
The Order did little to expand the scope of bargaining. That remains limited
and continues to frustrate union efforts to gain a greater voice in determining
the conditions under which their members work. The Order also created condi-
tions favorable to large unions and to national headquarters. Successful and
realistic local bargaining could well be the cornerstone of stable and successful
labor-management programs that would serve the public interest. The effort
in this area was largely hortatory.
Central Organization
Any discussion of Executive Order No. 11,491 logically starts with Section
four, establishing the Federal Labor Relations Council. The Council consists
of the Chairman, Civil Service Commission acting as Council Chairman, the
Secretary of Labor, an official of the Executive Office of the President, and
such other officials of the Executive Branch as the President may designate
from time to time. Staff services and assistance were to be supplied by the Civil
Service Commission.
The Council is the central body for administering and interpreting the Order.
Its other functions are to decide major policy and to regulate the program. In
representation, unfair labor practices, and standards cases, the Council may,
at its discretion, consider appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary of
Labor. The Council considers appeals directly from certain agency decisions
regarding negotiability of issues and exceptions to arbitration awards. Its pow-
ers are strengthened by a broad grant giving it the right to consider "other
matters it deems appropriate to assure the effectuation of the purposes of the
Order." The formation of the Council and the concurrent grant of authority
for overall direction of the program seemed to meet the express recommenda-
tions of the unions as well as some agency representatives. 5 But there have
been objections on the grounds that there are no labor representatives on the
Council."
Under Section 5 of the Order, a Federal Service Impasses Panel was estab-
35. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 22, 120, 408-09, 417-19, 634, 641-42.
36. Young, Labor Management Order Draws Mixed Reaction, Washington Sunday Star, Nov.
9, 1969, at A-2, col. 1; Cramer, Unions Mark Time on Nixon Order, Washington Daily News,
Dec. 1, 1969, at 2, col. 4; Berger, The Old Order Giveth Way to the New: A Comparison of Exec.
Order No. 10,988 with Exec. Order No. 11,491, 21 LAB. L.J. 79, 81 (1970).
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lished as an agency within the Council. The Panel consists of at least three
members appointed by the President, and is authorized to consider, assist in,
or actually resolve negotiation impasses. Sections 16 and 17 set forth the
procedures to be followed by the Panel, including the use of the Federal Media-
tion Service. However, arbitration or fact-finding with recommendations is to
be employed only when directed by the Panel. The charter of the Panel seemed
to be a direct, if belated, response to union recommendations. 7
The Wirtz Committee Draft Report had encouraged the use of voluntary
techniques by the parties. But the Hampton Committee was of the opinion that
arbitration or third-party fact-finding should be available only when authorized
by a governmental authority separate from the parties involved. Hence, the
Federal Service Impasses Panel was granted plenary authority in this area.
Section 6 of the Order completed the basic machinery for centralized admin-
istration of the program by assigning the principal case-handling responsibili-
ties to the Assistant Secretary of Labor under regulations prescribed by him.
He is responsible for deciding unit and related representation questions, super-
vising elections, deciding complaints of unfair labor practices and alleged viola-
tions of the standards of conduct for labor organizations.
This broad grant of authority for adjudication and enforcement in the key
areas of unit and representation issues, unfair labor practices, and conduct of
labor organizations gives to the Department of Labor a crucial role in adminis-
tration of the program. Under Section II of Executive Order No. 10,988, the
Department successfully exercised a limited rule-making function in elections
and unit and representation questions, and also arranged for advisory arbitra-
tion. Some criticism was directed at alleged inconsistencies in the decisions of
the arbitrators. Arbitrators were selected from panels on a contract basis,
bound by no precedents, and occasionally limited in their knowledge of the
federal personnel system or representation case law in the private sector.
The Department of Labor, although authorized by Section 6(c) of the new
Order to borrow employees from other agencies, has relied primarily on its own
personnel. It has established a new unit with field and headquarters personnel
to investigate and adjudicate cases arising under the Order and, in the absence
of voluntary compliance, to issue orders for enforcement.
The Assistant Secretary is required not only to decide appropriate unit ques-
tions but also to supervise representation elections and to certify results. Cen-
37. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 12. Statement by AFL-CIO President George Meany, "In our
1961 statement to the Task Force, we proposed procedures which in the last analysis relied on
arbitration to settle unresolved disputes involving conditions of employment or grievances. Such
procedures are essential in view of the denial to Federal workers of the right to strike."
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tralization of these responsibilities was urged before the Review Committee in
1967 by both labor and management representatives.
The Order does not specifically authorize the Assistant Secretary to prose-
cute complaints of unfair labor practices, as is done by the National Labor
Relations Board, for the private sector." The Committee Report recom-
mended that informal and formal attempts at resolution by the agency and
union should precede any consideration by the Assistant Secretary. If the
Assistant Secretary finds a reasonable basis for the complaint, a hearing is to
be directed, and, after a report, a decision is to be issued by the Assistant
Secretary.
3 1
Although the Committee offered no explanation for excluding prosecutory
functions from the unfair labor practice procedures, there may be some appar-
ent validity to the decision. First, if the Department of Labor were to undertake
such a responsibility, the manpower costs would be substantial. Second, since
this program is based on affirmative action by the President, and since experi-
ence has shown that agencies will support the program, it seems appropriate
to place the emphasis on voluntary resolution of issues by the parties and to
require third-party adjudication only when such joint efforts have failed. The
need for a prosecutor appears superfluous.
Recognition
In Sections 7 through 10, the Order covered the subject of recognition. The key
features eliminate multiple forms of recognition, bar elections in a unit or
subdivision thereof for twelve months after a valid election in such unit, require
agencies to establish systems for dealing with supervisors outside the
framework of regular union-management relations, and provide a new relation-
ship of national consultation rights. Units seeking exclusive recognition shall
not include supervisors or guards, but guards may organize in separate units,
unaffiliated with the labor organizations that represent other categories of
employees. There is an additional guide to the "community of interest" re-
quirement in determining the appropriate unit, that it "will promote effective
dealings and efficiency of agency operations." Exclusive recognition is avail-
able without the membership requirements that had been called for by Execu-
tive Order No. 10,988. However, it is to be determined by use of secret ballot
elections in all cases.
These changes clearly resulted from experience under Executive Order No.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
39. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
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10,988. At times, they reflect the views of some but not all unions and respond
to some agency recommendations. They also strengthen the principle of exclu-
sivity and consequently that of collective bargaining. They accept some guid-
ance from the National Labor Relations Act and reject other provisions of that
Act as administered by the National Labor Relations Board and interpreted
by the courts. Some of the changes are controversial, but the overall impact
would seem to bring increased order and balance to the program.
Section 7(a) taken with Section 18(a) follows the requirement of Executive
Order No. 10,988 that recognition will not be accorded to labor organizations
subject to corrupt or undemocratic influences. But, under Section 6(a)(4), any
decision of this kind is now the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary instead
of agency heads as the former order provided.
Section 7(c) bars new representation decisions for a twelve-month period
after an election, and extends the bar to subdivisions of the unit. The Commit-
tee Report noted that there had been some confusion in the interpretation of
Section 3(b) of Executive Order No. 10,988, which covered this subject. Ac-
cordingly, it recommended that the rule governing the private sector be fol-
lowed.4"
Section 7(f) eliminates informal recognition. This action had wide support
from union and management representatives. It may have once had a place in
the program, but it no longer serves a useful purpose.
Section 8 provides that formal recognition shall no longer be accorded but
that any existing arrangement shall continue until the labor organization ceases
to be eligibile for formal recognition or until a labor organization wins exclu-
sive recognition for the unit or the formal recognition is terminated under
regulations prescribed by the Federal Labor Relations Council. Grants of for-
mal recognition terminated July 1, 1971. The testimony of most agencies in the
1967 hearings recommended discontinuing formal recognition. It was pointed
out that formal recognition produced problems which hindered stable labor
relations, contributed to unit fragmentation, caused confusing and overlapping
relationships, and resulted in difficulties in maintaining an appropriate differ-
ence in the rights and obligations under this form of recognition compared with
those prescribed for exclusive recognition. Most unions recommended its reten-
tion on the grounds that it assisted organizational efforts and made possible
dues withholding privileges.4
The Wirtz Committee Report recommended retention of formal recognition
but would have restructured the concept by raising the membership require-
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 33-34.
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ment from 10 to 30 percent and by limiting consultation rights to allow only
conferring on proposed changes in personnel policies which are of concern to
their members." The Committee also recommended that application of the
increased membership requirement to unions currently holding formal recogni-
tion be deferred for a two year period.
This proposal would have provided a powerful incentive for unions to seek
exclusive recognition. If it was followed, formal recognition would have disap-
peared in time. However, the Hampton Committee was of the opinion that such
a proposal "would not adequately alleviate present difficulties and could pro-
duce additional problems." Noting that over fifty percent of the federal work
force was covered by exclusive recognition, the Committee concluded that
employees and labor organizations no longer needed the special assistance in
organizing that formal recognition provided and that its continuance was not
warranted in view of the problems involved in administering multiple forms of
recognition .43
Section 9 of the Order substituted "national consultation rights" for formal
recognition at the national level. This form of recognition is to be granted by
the agency to a labor organization which represents a substantial number of
employees of the agency. The criteria for granting these rights have been estab-
lished by the Federal Labor Relations Council. "National consultation rights"
will not be granted if another labor organization holds exclusive recognition
for that unit at the national level. Agency decisions concerning this form of
recognition may be appealed to the Assistant Secretary of Labor.
A labor organization holding national consultation rights will be notified of
those proposed substantive changes in personnel policies that affect employees
it represents and have the opportunity to comment; it may suggest changes in
personnel policies and its views will be carefully considered; it may confer in
person at reasonable times on request, and at all times it may present its views
in writing. An agency is not required to consult on any matter on which it would
not be required to meet and confer if the union was entitled to exclusive
recognition.
The proposal for a system of national consultation rights originated with the
AFL-CIO." Contending that formal recognition at the national level was con-
fusing, and often ineffective, union spokesmen suggested its replacement with
a system of comprehensive consultation rights regarding the formulation, im-
plementation, and interpretation of all personnel policies and practices, and
42. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7.
43. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 34.
44. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 15-16.
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that agency level rights extend to discussions with the Civil Service Commis-
sion.
Both the Draft Report and the 1969 Committee Report found merit in the
labor testimony. Beyond the semantics intended to clarify the relationship, the
third-party role in the development of criteria and the right to appeal agency
determinations to the Assistant Secretary of Labor seem to provide a more
solid base for stabilizing union-agency relations at the national level. Such a
device is necessary in large departments, where exclusive recognition may be
won by labor organizations representing large numbers of employees. The
representatives then find themselves dealing with agency management at levels
as much as three times removed from the personnel policy makers. Thus,
national consultation rights may give such labor representatives a voice at the
top.
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 11.,491 made significant changes in the
procedures and criteria for the granting of exclusive recognition. All member-
ship requirements are dropped, but an election supervised by the Assistant
Secretary of Labor is required in every case. Elections will be decided by the
majority of employees voting. Supervisors are to be excluded from units and
guards will neither be in the same unit with other employees nor represented
by a labor organization which includes other employees as members or is
affiliated with such an organization. The criteria for determining an appropri-
ate unit is amended by adding to the "community of interest" requirement the
consideration that the unit will be one that "will promote effective dealings and
efficiency of agency operations." National exclusive recognition is no longer
discouraged. Section 10 is silent on the subject, but the Committee Report
clearly accepts this form of recognition. 5
Section 10(e) provided essentially the same rights and obligations for a labor
organization holding exclusive recognition as did Executive Order No. 10,988.
However, the opportunity to be present at discussions between management
and employees is now limited to "formal" discussions.
On the whole, Section 10 clarified the composition of the unit, stream-lined
procedures for recognition, and strengthened the third-party role of the Assist-
ant Secretary of Labor. It is a curious amalgam, responsive in part to both
union and agency proposals made in open hearing. Some provisions are appar-
ently based on experiences and conclusions of labor relations managers and
experts at the state and local levels. Yet, in part, Section 10 also reflects the
philosophy or goals of the Administration.
The testimony at the 1967 hearings reflected widespread support for third-
45. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36.
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party administration of bargaining unit determinations and majority represen-
tation questions from both unions and federal agencies. The agencies had
found the problems of administering elections and related questions increas-
ingly complex and burdensome. The arbitration process for unit determinations
was uncertain and failed to develop, through precedent, a reliable body of law.
The unions objected to the initial agency authority, to the process itself as
cumbersome, and to the "so called" 60 percent rule as inequitable, and incon-
sistent with the principles followed by the NLRB and those governing federal,
state, and local political elections. Both the Wirtz Committee and the Hampton
Committee accepted these proposals. Thus, the provisions in Executive Order
No. 11,491 assigning to the Assistant Secretary of Labor the responsibility for
unit determinations and questions of majority status, including the supervision
of elections, responded to problems and needs expressed by the parties in-
volved.
The requirement making a secret ballot election mandatory for the granting
of exclusive recognition is not a provision nurtured in the 1967 hearings nor is
it consistent with policy followed by the federal government for the private
sector. At the hearings, only one agency proposed the elimination of the use
of authorization cards in determining majority status for exclusive recogni-
tion. 6 The Wirtz Committee recommended following the practices used in the
private sector.47 The Hampton Committee, however, recommended that exclu-
sive recognition should be determined by use of secret ballot elections in all
cases. After noting that the 10 percent membership requirement had not proven
significantly beneficial and had created administrative problems in determining
eligibility, the Committee said:
Similarly, experience has been unsatisfactory with the use of author-
ization cards, dues withholding authorizations, petitions and other
such materials as the basis for determining whether a majority of
the employees in a unit wish to have a labor organization as the
exclusive representative. While such signed materials can ade-
quately show the interest of employees in choosing a representative,
or in changing or discontinuing a representative, they are not suffi-
ciently conclusive to be the basis for a determination of the will of
the majority without an election.4"
In light of the absence of testimony before the Review Committee supporting
the above conclusions, and the lack of attention given to this subject by the
Wirtz Committee, it must be assumed that the Committee had access to infor-
46. Statement by W. L. Johnson, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Administration, General
Services Administration, before the Review Committee, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 162.
47. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7.
48. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35.
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mation which has not been made public. Some published quantification, or at
least a number of examples from agency experiences would have made the
conclusions more acceptable. An attorney, commenting on this provision, ob-
serves that management organizations, management attorneys, and personnel
experts in the private sector have long questioned the true value of authoriza-
tion cards in unit elections, but were rebuffed by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Company, Inc. 9 He acknowledges that in some phases of
labor policy the federal government may justify different approaches for gov-
ernment and industry, but he questions whether any basis, other than philo-
sophical, can be established for determining that elections are mandatory in
majority status determination among federal employees and optional for em-
ployees in the private sector. 0
As a practical matter, the election requirement removes considerable discre-
tion from the parties and adds what may be unnecessary bureaucratic proce-
dures to the process of exclusive recognition. Without further data, the Com-
mittee recommendation cannot be evaluated on either substantive or adminis-
trative grounds.
The consideration of "effective dealings and efficiency of agency operations"
along with the standard employee "community of interest" as the basis for
determining the appropriate unit is likewise a step away from federal policy
governing the private sector. Congress, in Section nine of the National Labor
Relations Act, was concerned with assuring employees the fullest freedom in
exercising their rights and providing some protection to craft units." However,
the Committee Report seems more concerned with administrative convenience.
The Report says:
The present Order's language has been criticized as deficient in that
it does not provide adequate criteria for purposes of appropriate
unit determination. We are aware of the difficulties encountered in
this area of public sector labor relations. We recognize that the
element of uniqueness in each situation requires handling appropri-
ate unit determinations on a case-by-case basis, and that such deter-
mination must be tied basically to a clear and identifiable commun-
ity of interest of the employees involved. However, we recommend
that in addition to meeting the "community of interest" criterion,
an appropriate unit must be one that promotes effective dealings
and efficiency of agency operations. We believe that these addi-
tional criteria are essential to insure effective Federal labor-
management relations. 2
49. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
50. Wallenberger, Nixon v. Gissel, Shall the Twain Ever Meet?, 20 LAB. L.J. 787 (1969).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
52. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35.
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The Wirtz Committee used essentially the same language in making the
same recommendation and also pointed out "that providing for a centralized
responsibility for the determination of appropriate units should bring greater
order and consistency to the resolution of such questions. As unit decisions are
issued, a body of precedent will be developed on which interested parties will
be able to draw for guidance. ' 53
It does not seem illogical to conclude that the replacing of ad hoc arbitration
by a centralized authority should reduce, if not eliminate, the need for addi-
tional criteria for determining the appropriate unit. Yet both Committees
reached the contrary conclusion. The basis for the Committee recommenda-
tions may have originated in the 1967 hearings, but state and local laws and
the viewpoint of officials and commentators on public employee labor-
management relations seem to have had considerable influence.
The labor relations managers and writers, who support the need for addi-
tional criteria in determining the appropriate unit in public employment, em-
phasize the differences between the public and private sectors. It is contended
that, because of the peculiarities of public employment relations, determination
of the appropriate unit for bargaining may well present greater difficulties. 4
The proponents of this point of view agree that the scope and nature of the
bargaining unit affect the range of negotiations, the role of the separate
branches of government, the likelihood of peaceful resolution of disputes, the
proportion of order versus chaos in bargaining, and, ultimately, the success of
the whole idea of collective bargaining for public employees. The conclusion is
that larger units should be favored over smaller ones.5 Other experts recognize
that there are strong reasons for broad units in the public service. However,
they note that the larger the units, the more likely it is that minority interests
will not be adequately recognized and the greater the possibilities of internal
friction.5" Some suggest that statutes be general so that agencies remain flexible
and free to improve unit determinations to the benefit of the collective bargain-
ing process.57
Those who do not agree that public sector bargaining is significantly differ-
53. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7.
54. Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A
Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 903 (1969).
55. Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1969).
See also HABER, THE RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE TO PUBLIC SECTOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOR
RELATIONS, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (1968). Mr. Haber provides a pragmatic analysis of differences
in public and private sector employment and the problems caused by excessive unit fragmentation.
56. A SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS (1968), excerpt of remarks by John T. Dunlop.
57. Id. at 10, excerpt of remarks by Morris Slavney.
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ent from private employment practices hold that determining the appropriate
unit in public employment should present no essentially different problems.
They argue that one finds the same considerations of gerrymandering, com-
munity of interest, and bargaining history that have prevailed in the private
sector. Different levels of bargaining are suggested for various categories of
bargaining subjects, with different representatives for the different units."
It appears that the new criteria in Executive Order No. 11,491 represents an
acceptance of the theory that public employment is different from employment
in the private sector and requires broader bargaining units. 9 The development
of this theory in the federal sector will depend on the weight given the new
requirement that "the unit be one which will promote effective dealings and
efficiency of agency operations." This requirement is to be used by the Assist-
ant Secretary of Labor in determining the appropriate unit on a case-by-case
basis under Section 6(a)(l) of the Order, and by the Federal Labor Relations
Council in adjudicating appeals under Section 4(c)(1). Since many of the par-
ties involved are responsible for the new standard, it can be anticipated that it
will be given considerable weight. The cases will probably arise not only when
two unions are contending for representation status, but also when there is a
petition for less than an installation-wide unit and the agency, in the interest
of effective dealings and efficiency of operations, contends that only the
installation-wide unit meets the test. Some agencies, the Departments of the
Navy and Air Force, in particular, had initially sought installation-wide units
under Executive Order No. 10,988. After being overruled in a number of
advisory arbitrations, the Navy changed its position. The Air Force, however,
continued to seek installation-wide units and its employees are generally repre-
sented in larger local units than other Departments.
Despite the impressive group of witnesses who support broad units as neces-
sary because of the peculiarities of public employment, there are objections to
the theory and to the unilateral decision to tilt the guidelines in that direction.
It was the experience of the private sector that units evolved in accordance with
the situation, pressures from management and unions, and organization struc-
tures in the plant, corporation, or industry. The patterns are many-faceted and
ever-changing. 0 Depending on "community of interest" and bargaining his-
tory, the federal bargaining structure also saw a variety of units recognized
under Executive Order No. 10,988. The process was not always orderly, but
58. Address by Clyde W. Summers, Sixth Annual Midwest Labor Law Conference, Columbus,
Ohio, Oct. 4, 1969. 318 G.E.R.R. B-6 (Oct. 13, 1969).
59. Support for the larger unit theory is found in PICKETS AT CITY HALL, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON LABOR DISPUTES IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1970) (hereinafter cited as PICKETS AT CITY HALL].
60. THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Weber ed. 1961).
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there was considerable employee participation in determining the appropriate
unit.
Although the new Order tends to favor the broad bargaining unit, both the
Wirtz and Hampton Committees recommended consideration by agencies and
unions of multi-unit and joint bargaining covering any combination of units at
any level of the agency where the parties are in agreement that such an arrange-
ment would provide for more productive negotiations. It was also recom-
mended that the Council study this aspect of collective bargaining to determine
whether further guidance on this matter is warranted in the federal program."'
The Report fixes rules favoring broad units and suggests that by agreement
these units may be joined in varying combinations to produce effective negotia-
tions. The concept of joint and multi-unit bargaining provides a pragmatic
solution that affords employees a maximum role in exercising their rights and
adjusts the unit to the issues to be negotiated. In this process, there is no need
to require homogenized broad units as the building blocks for multi-unit or
joint bargaining.
In concluding the discussion on the appropriate unit, this writer is not con-
vinced that the additional standard in Section 10(b) of the Order will ensure
the fullest freedom to employees in exercising their rights under the Order, or
in evolving a flexible bargaining structure that can be used by the parties for
effective dealings at many levels and on many different issues.
Agreements
The rule and procedures concerning the negotiation and approval of bargaining
agreements were set forth in Sections 11-15 of the Order. Executive Order No.
10,988 had placed on agencies and unions a joint obligation to record, in
writing, agreements reached through negotiations. Although circumscribed by
laws, regulations, and broad management rights provisions, the unions" had
utilized the opportunity to secure 1,181 contracts covering 1,175,524 employees
or 43 percent of the federal work force. This is without reference to the more
than 20,000 supplemental postal agreements."2
Despite this evidence of successful bargaining, labor spokesmen were un-
happy with agency implementation of bargaining. They had found, inter alia,
a bewildering complex of agency regulations, a lack of delegated authority to
61. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7.
62. Wilfred V. Gill, Director, Office of Labor-Management Relations, U.S. Civil Service
Commission, during Hearings on Postal Labor Relations and Employee Morale Before the Sub-
comm. on Postal Operations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 91, pt. 7, at 100 (1969).
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local agency officials, and unilateral agency decisions removing items from the
bargaining table-all of which limited meaningful bargaining.
Sections 11 through 15 of Executive Order No. 11,491 responded in part to
these criticisms. Those sections provided in relevant part as follows:
(1) The obligation of the parties to meet, confer, and negotiate written
agreements was buttressed by a requirement that such negotiations be "in good
faith."
(2) The framework of law and policy governing negotiations was clarified.
The Order continued to exclude broad policy areas from content of negotiation.
But it did authorize the parties to negotiate "agreements providing appropriate
arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact of realignment
of work forces or technological change."
(3) Procedures were established to resolve disputes concerning the negotia-
bility of a matter. If a union disagrees with an agency determination that a
proposal is non-negotiable because it would violate law, government regulation,
or the Order, or if the union believes that an agency regulation, as interpreted
by the agency violates law of regulation, the union may appeal to the Federal
Labor Relations Council (FLRC) for final resolution.
The Order restated the requirement to incorporate a number of standard
provisions in all labor-management agreements. These include a broad man-
agement rights clause and a prohibition of the union or agency shop. However,
an agency is no longer free to change a negotiated agreement unilaterally by
revising agency regulations.
Agreements remained subject to agency head approval, but disapproval
could only result from failure of the agreement to conform with law, policy,
or regulation. Agreements could establish grievance procedures to cover em-
ployee grievances and disputes over the interpretation and application of agree-
ments. The negotiated grievance system was to be the exclusive procedure
available to employees in the unit. Advisory arbitration was eliminated. Agree-
ments could provide for the arbitration of employee grievances and disputes
over the interpretation or application of existing agreements, subject to the
right of either party to file exceptions to the arbitration award with the
FLRC. Arbitration did not extend to changes or proposed changes in agree-
ments or agency policy.
In summary, these sections of the Order are intended to clarify the frame-
work of law and policy surrounding negotiations, increase the scope of bargain-
ing, encourage the delegation of authority, reduce unilateral decision making,
and provide for more effective third-party resolution of employee grievances
and disputes arising out of the administration or interpretation of contracts.
Evaluation of these provisions and their potential effectiveness requires consid-
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eration of the proposals for changes made by both labor and management in
1967.
The AFL-CIO and its many affiliates, appearing before the President's
Review Committee in 1967, took the position that "collective bargaining in the
Federal Service has not yet become the recognized process for determining
personnel policies and working conditions" and that "to achieve genuine collec-
tivebargaining it is necessary to widen the scope of collective bargaining and
to enlarge the authority of local activity management." The various witnesses
consistently pointed out that the local installation manager could bargain on
subjects only within his administrative discretion. Further discretion was deter-
mined by agency regulations, which were unilaterally established and
amended. 3 They also found frustrating, and contrary to principles of collective
bargaining, the experience of reaching agreement on terms of a local contract
only to have top-agency management veto clauses for reasons other than a
violation of law. Accordingly, the AFL-CIO recommended that all matters
concerning personnel policy and practices and affecting working conditions
should be negotiable items where consistent with law. Agency regulations,
present and future, would not limit bargaining. A second recommendation was
to abolish the requirement of agency approval of a negotiated agreement. The
signature of the agency bargaining representative would be binding.
A third specific recommendation was to amend the last sentence of Section
6(b) of Executive Order No. 10,988 and to delete Section 7(2). These sections
constituted the formidable management rights provision which narrowed the
scope of bargaining. Section 6(b) excluded from bargaining the subjects of
mission, budget, organization, the assignment of personnel, and the technology
of performing work. The latter items directly affected the jobs of employees,
particularly those displaced by technological changes. The major purpose was
not to hinder change, but rather to negotiate procedures that would protect
workers in such instances.
Section 7(2) allowed management the right to hire, assign, and promote
personnel and to determine the methods, means, and personnel for performing
agency work. Since most of these items were governed by law, the union
representatives argued that there was no reason why such items could not be
subject to negotiations within the framework of those laws.
Some labor organizations were not willing to limit their bargaining interests.
The National Federation of Federal Employees recommended that the scope
of bargaining be expanded to include negotiations on personnel policies affect-
63. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS. The labor and management viewpoints presented and discussed
here are based on this transcript unless otherwise noted.
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ing changes in mission, budget, organization, assignment of personnel, and
technology of performing work. The National Association of Letter Carriers
(AFL-CIO) was more succinct, contending that union representatives should
be permitted to discuss and negotiate in any area which affects the welfare of
their members.
These union recommendations found support in the testimony of Professor
Russell Allen, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State Uni-
versity. Professor Allen observed that the two management rights sections were
so comprehensively worded that management, if so disposed, could rule out
virtually all bargaining. He recommended that the language of the Order
should be changed to provide that where the Federal Personnel Manual or
agency regulations conflict with negotiated agreements, the latter should gov-
ern. He saw no necessary conflict with the merit system.
The Departments of the Government did not agree. Army argued that rather
than change the scope of bargaining, alert representation would find more areas
to negotiate within the present rules. Navy and Air Force would retain and
reemphasize the management rights sections. Commerce and Treasury main-
tained that there should be no change that would impede management's final
authority for the operation of the agency. The Department of Interior on the
other hand, contended that executive action should be taken to bring the federal
program in closer alliance with the policies and procedures followed in the
private sector. It recommended that the scope of bargaining be expanded and
that unilateral management regulation be de-emphasized.
Generally, the August 1969 Committee Report followed the reasoning and
recommendations of the Draft Report of January 1969. Section 1 1(b) of the
Order reflected the unions' strong interest in the right to negotiate protective
arrangements for employees adversely affected by changes in work and tech-
nology. 4 The Committee also concluded that the phrase, "assignment of per-
sonnel," had sometimes been interpreted to exclude from negotiation the poli-
cies followed by management in such actions as assigning employees to particu-
lar shifts or tours of duty. Finding that the language's intent applied only to
the agency's right to establish staffing patterns, the Committee recommended
the clarifying language now also part of Section 1 l(b). 5
While it was accepted that local managers lacked authority to bargain, the
recommendation to authorize bargaining on any subject, not inconsistent with
law, was rejected. The Committee urged agencies to increase, where practical,
delegations of authority to local managers. 6 The Committee also recognized
64. COMMITTEE REPORT 38.
65. Id. at 39.
66. Id.
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the need for procedures to reduce unilateral agency decisions on negotiability
questions and responded by including, under certain circumstances, an appeal
to the Council.61
The Committee also stated that a labor organization should be permitted to
file an unfair labor practice complaint whenever it believed that a management
official had been arbitrary or in error in excluding a matter from negotiation
which had been determined negotiable through the process now described in
Secfion 11 (c). 8 While agreeing with the unions that the requirement for agency
approval of negotiated agreements had resulted, at times, in unnecessary or
arbitrary revisions, the Committee maintained retention of the requirement
was necessary. It was also convinced that limitations were appropriate and the
result is Section 15 of the Order. 9
Further, the Committee stated that the alleged practice of changing agency
regulations to nullify clauses in negotiated agreements should not continue.
Section 12(a) of the Order negates the impact of agency regulations subsequent
to an agreement unless required by law or other outside authority.
The management rights provisions of Section 7(2) of Executive Order No.
10,988 were incorporated without change in Section 12(b) of Executive Order
No. 11,491. While the Hampton Report is silent on the subject, the Wirtz
Committee Draft Report would have modified this clause. Stating that many
of the practices and procedures followed by management in the exercise of
these rights were appropriate subjects for negotiation, the Wirtz Draft would
have continued the requirement that agreements recognize the responsibility of
management officials to take such actions as were necessary to carry out their
prescribed duties and responsibilities. The requirement, the Draft continued,
should recognize that the exercise of such rights must conform to the terms and
conditions of the negotiated agreement."0
In commenting on the events leading to the Executive Order No. 11,491
changes, it is well to remember that the limited scope of bargaining has been
one of the major obstacles to developing balanced and fruitful labor relations
in the federal sector. The pre-emption by Congress of the "bread and butter"
items-pay, insurance, health benefits, and retirement-reduces the parties to
negotiating personnel policies, procedures, practices, and specific working con-
ditions. The strong management rights provisions of Executive Order No.
10,988 often limited bargaining on these subjects to collaboration on proce-
dures. The scope of negotiation remains limited. The favorable aspects lie, first,
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 40.
70. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 7.
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in the increased emphasis of delegating greater authority to local managers and
encouraging multi-unit bargaining. Second, the limitation on the authority of
the agency head to reject or modify agreements should reduce frustration at
local levels. Finally, third-party review of negotiability issues adds some bal-
ance to the bargaining table.
It is safe to say that the modification of Section 7(2) of Executive Order No.
10,988 would have broadened the ability to bargain while leaving fundamental
authority and relationships unchanged. Until the Section 7(2) management
rights are brought within the collective bargaining process, meaningful negotia-
tion is unduly limited. Private management has yielded, albeit 'grudgingly' in
this area and industry still functions.7 A government that proclaims its belief
in the validity of collective bargaining should not follow this same line of re-
sistance. Viable labor relations will demand a widened scope of bargaining
through either executive or legislative action.
In concluding this discussion, a final reference to Sections 13 and 14 is
necessary. In their testimony, the agencies offered few positive comments on
changes in the grievance system. The unions favored a single system for all
grievances and appeals and the use of the negotiated procedure to the exclusion
of any agency procedure and binding arbitration. The Hampton Committee,
however, did not accept this proposal.72 It recommended eliminating the dual
agency system, broadening of the scope to include disputes over the administra-
tion and interpretation of agreements, and establishing binding arbitration
subject to appeal by either party to the Council. These recommendations are
now part of the new Order.
In the 1967 hearings, the Departments and Agencies strongly recommended
that the role of the supervisor be clarified, that he not be a member of the
bargaining unit, and that he not be an official or representative of a labor
organization.73 Those unions oriented to bargaining in the private sector had
little or no comment on this subject. Two large government service unions, the
AFGE and the NFFE, proposed that the application to employees and unions
of any conflict of interest provision be liberally construed and that considera-
tion be given to prohibiting only those situations where there was a "conflict
in fact."7
71. Address by Neil W. Chamberlain, 5th Annual Orvil E. Dryfoos Conference on Public
Affairs, Public Affairs Center, Dartmouth College, May 1968, Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector, in NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, NEGOTIATION RESEARCH DIGEST (1968). Dr. Chamberlain notes
that the principle of the management prerogative now laid to rest in the private sector is very much
alive in the public sector and supported by basically specious argument.
72. COMMITTEE REPORT 41-42.
73. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 118, 121, statement by Arthur W. Alkins, Deputy Undersecre-
tary of the Army for Manpower.
74. Id. at 661-62.
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The Committee viewed supervisors as part of management. It recommended:
The term 'supervisor' should be expressly defined and supervisors
should be considered part of management. Recognition should not
be granted for mixed units or for units consisting solely of supervi-
sors. Supervisors should not participate in the management or rep-
resentation of labor organizations which represent other employees.
Agencies should take steps to improve the status of supervisors and
associations of supervisors by insuring that they are afforded the
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in the management
process and to have their problems carefully considered.15
These recommendations were incorporated into the Order. The conflict of
interest provision was expanded and specifically prohibited supervisors from
acting as union officers or representatives. A definition of the term "supervi-
sor" similar to that found in the LMRA, as amended, was included."6 It was
provided that a supervisor is not an employee for the purpose of formal or
exclusive recognition or national consultation rights. Supervisory groups were
excluded from recognition as labor organizations. Establishing a unit for pur-
poses of exclusive recognition which included any management official or su-
pervisor was prohibited. There was also a limited savings clause for certain
supervisory representation in units which have historically functioned in this
manner. Finally, agencies were instructed to establish a system for intra-
management communication and consultation with supervisors or associations
of supervisors.
These provisions of the Order formed a comprehensive approach to the
problems relating to the role of the supervisor. The transition period initiated
under Executive Order No. 10,988, which found supervisors in various union
roles, could be at an end. However, the definition of "supervisor" and the
extent to which the Executive Branch can limit the composition of employee
participation in union activities must be buttressed by criteria in specific cases.
Conduct of Labor Organizations and Management
Sections 18 and 19 of the new Order incorporated with modifications the
Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and the Code of Fair Labor
Practices in the Federal Service, promulgated May 21, 1963. There were a
number of key changes. The plenary power of the agencies inhibited unions
from seeking relief through the filing of an unfair labor complaint and there
was little reported activity. The Assistant Secretary of Labor now has initial
jurisdiction in these areas under Section 6(a)(4) of the Order; this third-party
75. COMMITTEE REPORT 36.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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administration should give an aura of due process that has heretofore been
lacking.
The Standards of Conduct set forth in Section 18 contained one significant
change from the previous Standards. Section 18(c) and (d) requires unions,
having or seeking recognition, to file financial and other reports, provide for
bonding of officials and employees of the organization, and comply with
trusteeship'and election standards under regulations to be issued by the Assist-
ant Secretary. The regulations were to conform to the principles applied to
unions in the private sector.
Both Review Committees believed that the above requirements were neces-
sary. Some unions were already under such reporting and financial obligations
required by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
The Committees maintained that all unions should meet the same requirements
and recommended accordingly." Many union leaders have protested the impo-
sition of these reporting requirements as extremely burdensome on small
locals. After some experience in administering these provisions on the public
and private sectors, it would seem that the Assistant Secretary of Labor could
adjust inequities by regulatory changes. This provision of the Order is consis-
tent with a belief that, as unions grow and acquire stature, they are expected
to accept responsibility, including the reporting and disclosure of financial
data.
Section 19(a) carried over, unchanged from the Code of Fair Labor Prac-
tices, the management actions prohibited as unfair labor practices. Thus, man-
agement cannot: interfere with employee exercise of rights assured by the
Order; encourage or discourage union membership by discrimination in hiring,
tenure of employment, etc.; sponsor or control a union; discipline or discrimi-
nate against an employee because he has filed a complaint or given testimony;
refuse to accord recognition to a qualified union; or refuse to consult, confer,
or negotiate with a union when required by the Order.
Section 19(b) enumerated these to be unfair labor practices. These, with few
exceptions, also were in the original Code. In Section 19(b)(3), however, the
new Order added to the Code provisions which, in Section 3.2(b)(3), prohibited
a union from "coercing, or attempting to coerce or discipline any member of
the organization as punishment or reprisal for, or for the purpose of hindering
or impeding his discharge of his duties owed as an officer or employee of the
United States."
Section 19(b)(3) reads:
A labor organization shall not-... (3) coerce, attempt to coerce,
or discipline, fine, or take other economic sanction against a mem-
77. COMMITTEE REPORT 42.
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ber of the organization as punishment or reprisal for, or for the
purpose of hindering or impeding his work performance, his
productivity, or the discharge of his duties owed as an officer or
employee of the United States. (Emphasis supplied to show new
language.)
The Committee was silent on the reasons for this language. Support for the
view that this is clarifying language is found in the United States Civil Service
Commission FPM Letter No. 711, dated August 30, 1963, which offered an
explanation of the original Standards and Code. Speaking with reference to
Section 3.2(b)(3), the Commission stated it was included in the Code "in recog-
nition of the special obligation that all parties to employee-management rela-
tions in the Federal service have to conduct themselves in such a manner as
not to interfere with the proper performance of the Government's busi-
ness. . ."
The specificity of the new language, including the prohibition against a union
fining a member as punishment to control his productivity, would seem to be
based on the theory that federal labor relations are indeed different from those
in the private sector. Sovereignty appears in many guises. The alternative
theory is to accept the contention that the Committee agreed with private
management that the federal labor policy governing unions in the private sector
is incorrect in this regard. 7 At issue is a Supreme Court decision holding that
a union may fine a member for immediately accepting pay for work which
exceeded a production ceiling.7"
"Off the Clock" Negotiations
Another controversial change in Executive Order No. 11,491 was the require-
ment that employees, negotiating for a union with agency management, should
not do so on official time.
While the previous Order had stated that consultations and meetings between
management and unions would be conducted whenever practicable on official
time, it authorized agencies to require that negotiations could be conducted
during non-duty hours. The Hampton Committee found that this "permissive-
ness" had resulted in widely divergent agency practices, inconsistent treatment
of employees similarly situated, and unduly protracted sessions. It concluded
that "an employee who negotiates an agreement on behalf of a labor organiza-
tion is working for that organization, and should not be a duty status when so
engaged."80 However, the omission in Section 20 of any guideline for the use
78. See Wallenberger, supra note 50.
79. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
80. COMMITTEE REPORT 40.
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of official time by employees representing unions in consultations and meetings
other than negotiations would seem to continue the same type of "permissive"
situation now eliminated by the Committee with respect to negotiations. More-
over, collective bargaining at any level will inevitably result in inconsistent
treatment of employees similarly situated. Consequently, one must conclude
that the Committee believed that agencies could not control protracted negotia-
tions.
It is safe to predict that small unions, unable to afford paid representatives,
will avoid protracted negotiations. However, the resulting agreements may
contribute little to the goals of the program. The large government union will
not be reached by this rule, except perhaps at the local level.
There is an appearance of inequity when management representatives, nor-
mally "on-the-clock," deal with employees, who are required to be on their own
time. The principle has been abandoned in much of industry. 1 As early as 1959,
a Department of Labor study noted that while labor contracts generally did
not provide pay for attendance at union meetings, conferences, and conven-
tions, there were provisions in some contracts for pay in activities of more
direct concern to the company including contract negotiations."
The rule is not consistent in a federal labor-management relations program
which has an expressed goal of greater employee participation in decisions
affecting their working conditions. It treats negotiations as a purely adversary
situation. It has been opposed not only by unions, but also by some members
of Congress.13
Amendments to Executive Order No. 11,491
With the issuance of Executive Order No. 11,491, the Council, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service began
organizing staff and preparing regulations. Despite the impact of the postal
strike and the Air Traffic Controllers' "sick out," these efforts were virtually
81. Remarks by Harold S. Roberts, supra note 8.
82. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1266, COMPANY PAY
FOR TIME SPENT ON UNION BUSINESS (1959).
83. See letter from Rep. David N. Henderson, Chairman, Manpower Subcommittee, House
Post Office and Civil Service Committee, to Chairman Hampton, Civil Service Commission,
reported by Cramer, Washington Daily News, Feb. 6, 1970, at 2, col. 4. The Congressman is
quoted,
[i]f in fact, as stated in the introductory statement of the executive order 'efficient admin-
istration of the government is benefited by providing employees an opportunity to partic-
ipate in the formulation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of
their employment' then both agency management and labor organizations are working
for the good of the government and should be treated equally.
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completed in 1970. Although there was considerable opinion expressed that the
critical work stoppages showed that the Order was obsolete, the Council did
not agree."' Chairman Hampton stated, "The Order is the best vehicle for both
sides to develop the necessary expertise for the day when it may be appropriate
to expand the scope of the bargaining." 5
In keeping with President Nixon's direction to institute a review and assess-
ment of operations under the Order, the Council held public hearings October
7-9, 1970.
They emphasized their belief that legislation is essential to establish mean-
ingful collective bargaining and called for radical revision in both the adminis-
tration and substance of the federal program. 6 They recommended enlarging
the scope of bargaining, developing more effective machinery to break negotia-
tion impasses, making grievance procedures and arbitration more meaningful,
and establishing an impartial government board to deal with unfair labor prac-
tice charges.
AFL-CIO President George Meany urged adoption of the procedures of fact
finding and binding arbitration from the Postal Reorganization Act. He also
favored government-wide bargaining between a five member council of unions
and the Civil Service Commission, with unresolved issues after 90 days of
negotiations referred for fact finding and, if necessary, binding arbitration.
The American Federation of Government Employees, the National Federa-
tion of Federal Employees, and representatives of professional groups agreed
that the restrictions on supervisory participation were too broad, reached too
84. Raskin, Uncle Sam Learns About Living With Labor, New York Times, April 20, 1970,
at 38, col. 5, "[from now on governmental collective bargaining will correspond much more to
the industrial pattern than it ever did under the pioneering Executive Order President Kennedy
promulgated in 1962 or even under the liberalized version President Nixon signed, to labor's de-
light less than six months ago." See 344 G.E.R.R. A-I (Apr. 13, 1970). Paul Treusch, President
Federal Bar Association, questioned the relevancy of the Order and requested the Federal Labor
Relations Council to hold "an immediate summit labor relations conference." The Council de-
clined on the ground that legislation was before Congress and there had been insufficient experi-
ence to gain the perspective needed for a productive conference, 346 G.E.R.R. A-4 (Apr. 27,
1970). 2 ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAW
OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, 1970 COMMITTEE REPORTS, holds the
Order obsolete because of the Postal and Air Controllers' strikes.
85. 362 G.E.R.R. A-13 (Aug. 17, 1970).
86. See 370 G.E.R.R. A-6 (Oct. 12, 1970); Memorandum, Anthony F. Ingrassia, Director,
Office of Labor-Management Relations, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Three-part briefing on
October 7-9 hearings of the Federal Labor Relations Council, Oct. 12, 1970. These documents offer
summaries of major points of testimony at the hearings. It should be emphasized that they are
not official reports. The discussion herein is based on these documents. The official transcript was
compiled by the Hoover Reporting Company, Inc., 320 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington,
D.C.
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far down in the organization levels, and denied career supervisors of due pro-
cess.
President Vincent Connery, National Association of Internal Revenue Em-
ployees, noted that the Civil Service Commission exercised unilateral control
over the scope of negotiability through the Federal Personnel Manual and that
neither bargaining party could negotiate with the Commission on the contents
of the FPM. He concluded, "to have to say that this vitiates the entire bargain-
ing process is almost to find oneself a disciple of the obvious." Michael B.
Ryan, President, National Labor Relations Board Union, also expressed con-
cern over the limited scope of negotiations and consultation stating that:
In the opinion of our organization, the management and effi-
ciency of the government would benefit from a total absence of
language restricting subjects of consultation and negotiation. There
are obviously areas in which management cannot be bound by nego-
tiated agreements. That does not mean that management would not
benefit from a thorough discussion of those areas with union repre-
sentatives-even including methods and means of accomplishing the
assigned mission . . . . At the very least, Section 11(b) should
make it plain that managers are not restricted from consulting with
union officials on those matters mentioned, even though the matters
may not become the subject of a negotiated contract.
Management representatives strongly supported the Order as an instrument
for progress in federal labor-management relations. Some opposed the statu-
tory approach as premature. There was also testimony against lifting the elec-
tion requirement for exclusive recognition or permitting any form of union
security. Management was divided on the issue of union negotiators being "off
the clock." Some would make it a negotiable item; others would extend the
concept.
Amendments to Executive Order No. 11,491 in the form of Executive Order
No. 11,616, with an accompanying report and recommendations of the Federal
Labor Relations Council, were published August 26, 1971.87
The substantive changes were few, reflecting the Council's conclusions that
it was clear throughout the proceedings, that, in general, the Order
has greatly enhanced the climate for collective bargaining in the
Federal service. . . . Other proposals were determined to be out-
side the scope of the current review or not appropriate for consider-
ation at this time in view of the limited experience under Executive
Order 11491.9
87. COUNCIL REPORT.
88. Id. at 27.
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The principal amendments are as follows:
(1) Professional associations are granted rights analogous to the
lawful associations not qualified as labor organizations; and,
(2) Collective bargaining agreements must include a grievance
procedure which shall be the exclusive procedure available to the
parties and the employees in the unit for differences for the interpre-
tation and application of the agreement. The negotiated grievance
procedure may not cover any other matters, including matters for
which statutory appeal procedures exist. An employee or group of
employees in the unit may present such grievances directly to the
agency, without the intervention of the exclusive representative, as
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the
agreement and the exclusive representative has been given the op-
portunity to be present at the adjustment. (Section 13 (a)); and,
(3) The negotiated procedure may provide for arbitration over
the interpretation or application of the agreement but not over any
other matters. Either the agency or exclusive representative may
invoke arbitration and either party may file exceptions to the arbi-
trator's award with the Council. The requirement for sharing of the
costs of arbitration has been eliminated and is now negotiable. (Sec-
tion 13(b)); and,
(4) An employee, regardless of whether he is in a unit of exclusive
recognition, is not precluded from exercising grievance or appellate
rights established by law or regulation or from choosing his own
representative, except when presenting a grievance under a negoti-
ated procedure. Grievance on matters outside the contract may be
presented under any procedure available. (Sections 13(c), 7 (d)(l));
and,
(5) The Assistant Secretary of Labor will rule on unresolved
issues concerning whether a grievance is subject to the negotiation
procedure or to arbitration. (Section 13(d)); and,
(6) The provision that an issue which can properly be raised
under an appeals procedure may not be raised as an unfair labor
practice is continued. But if an issue may be the subject of a griev-
ance or raised as an unfair labor practice, the aggrieved party may
elect the procedure to follow. (Section 19(d)); and,
(7) The prohibition against union negotiators being on official
time is modified to the extent that negotiating parties may agree
that the agency will either authorize official time for up to 40 hours
or authorize up to one-half the time spent in negotiations during
regular working hours, for a reasonable number of employees,
which number normally shall not exceed the number of manage-
ment representatives. (Section 20); and,
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(8) Agencies are no longer required to recover the costs of dues
deductions. The subject is negotiable. (Section 21); and,
(9) The Office of Management and Budget now joins the Civil
Service Commission in policy guidance of agencies on labor-
management relations and periodic review of the implementation of
such policies. (Section 25 (a)).
Including professional associations in those groups with which agencies may
have limited dealings is an effort to ease the problems of these organizations.
The Council Report states that
[I]n some instances, agencies may be overly fearful of violating the
rights of recognized labor organizations and unnecessarily refrain
from proper dealings with professional associations on purely pro-
fessional matters. To maintain such communications and to avoid
further misunderstandings we recommend that "professional" be
explicitly included among the types of associations listed in section
7(d)(3). . . .9
For many years prior to the formalizing of labor relations under executive
orders, the professional associations had the support of agency management.
Their membership included professional employees at all levels: rank and file
and supervisors and managers. Individual participation in professional activity
was encouraged and often funded. With the advent of recognized unions, many
of the professional groups faced difficult problems. If they did not seek recogni-
tion and function as a labor organization, they faced loss of membership to
unions who were actively organizing. Should they obtain recognition, they were
required to remove supervisors and managers from any active leadership roles
and forfeit privileges they had long enjoyed. The problems still must be worked
out by the parties, but the amendment offers a reasonable option for considera-
tion.
The amendments make considerable change in the grievance and arbitration
system. The primary goal of the Council seems to have been clarification and
elimination of confusion. An incidental result of the changes is a reduction in
the content of negotiated grievance procedures and the issues that can be taken
to arbitration. Unfortunately, the Council Report, much as the August 1969
Report accompanying Executive Order No. 11,491, does not fully explain the
rationale behind the specific changes. Slightly over one page of the Report is
devoted to discussion of the amended grievance and arbitration system.,"
89. Id.
90. Id. at 28-29. In the immediate discussion all references to Council statements on this
subject are based on these two pages of the Council Report.
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Several of the amendments improve the grievance system. No problems are
raised by the provision that matters on which employees have statutory appeal
rights are excluded from the negotiated grievance procedure nor by the drop-
ping of the requirement that such procedures must conform to Civil Service
regulations. Finally, an employee cannot utilize an outside representative to act
for him in a grievance under the negotiated procedure. These provisions remove
incentives for inter-union conflict, add to the authority of the exclusive repre-
sentative, and are not inconsistent with judicial reasoning."
The reasons for mandatory inclusion of a grievance procedure in all negoti-
ated contracts are not clear. Limiting the grievance and arbitration procedure
to grievances over the interpretation of the contract seems to reduce the influ-
ence of the exclusive representative. The Council's reasoning follows:
By thus delineating the scope of the negotiated grievance procedure,
the confusion and anomalies in present arrangements can effectively
be eliminated. In addition an incentive will be created for unions to
negotiate substantive agreements within the full scope of negotia-
tions authorized by the Order. The exclusive representative will be
clothed with full authority and responsibility for grievance process-
ing on the bilaterally determined conditions of employment."
The Council does not mention that this provision is a limiting of language
in both Executive Order Nos. 10,988 and 11,491. The first Order in Section
8(a) authorized "procedures for consideration of grievances" and in Section
8(b) allowed advisory arbitration which "shall extend only to the interpretation
or application of agreements or agency policy and not to changes in or pro-
posed changes in agreements or agency policy." Section 13, Executive Order
No. 11,491, authorized procedures for "consideration of employee grievances
and of disputes over the interpretation and application of agreements." Section
14 provided for "the arbitration of employee grievances and of disputes over
the interpretation or application of existing agreements." And further stated,
"[niegotiated procedures may not extend arbitration to changes or proposed
changes in agreements or agency policy." In attempting to develop standards
for a satisfactory grievance system, the Council faced a complex situation.
Absent amendments expanding the scope of bargaining, limiting the negotiated
grievance procedure to dealing with provisions of the contract simply gives the
exclusive representative more authority over less subject matter. This amend-
ment, therefore, does not seem to strengthen either the grievance system or
collective bargaining.
91. See Douds v. Local 1250, Retail & Wholesale Department Store Union of America. CIO.
173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
92. COUNCIL REPORT 28-29.
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The negotiability of arbitration costs probably should have little impact.
Neither labor nor management is in a position to do more or less than share
the costs of arbitration. Similarly, opening the costs of dues deductions to
negotiations is a small step forward.
The Council sidestepped a more significant expansion of bargaining by au-
thorizing negotiating within limits for "on-the-clock" bargaining for union
negotiators. The reluctance to open the entire subject to negotiation suggests a
lack of confidence in agency negotiators.
Given the existence of various grievance systems, there has been a need for
ready access to third-party resolution of disputes over arbitrability and even
grievability. Thus the assignment of this responsibility to the Assistant Secre-
tary provides such a forum. Since the Council already accepts appeals from
arbitration awards, it would appear to have been a logical choice for this task.
However it may be that considerable activity is expected in this area, and the
Assistant Secretary is organized for more routine case handling.
The posing of these kinds of questions to ad hoc arbitrators will increase both
the work load and central control of the Executive Branch over the content of
the grievance system. Much depends on the restraint of the parties and the
ability of agency management and union representatives to resolve most of
these issues. It is also hoped that the regulations of the Assistant Secretary will
provide for one appeal to settle both grievability and arbitrability in any one
case. Further, the extension of the Assistant Secretary jurisdiction to unfair
labor practice complaints is an improvement in the overall process.
An evaluation of the amendments and the Council Report requires an assess-
ment of subjects not considered in the Report. There is no mention of the
impact of the 1970 employee strikes, nor any comment on the efficacy of
federal anti-strike laws. It is true that the decisions settling the postal strike
and removing over 40 percent of federal employees in exclusive units from the
Executive Branch jurisdiction were not grounded on the provisions of the
Executive Order. Also, the work stoppage of the air controllers was terminated
through judicial and agency administrative process. Yet, to properly assess the
operations directed by the President, some comment on the general subject is
appropriate.
The Council listed 14 policy issues raised by interested parties but not appro-
priate for action either because,
the Executive Order appeared to be working effectively in the par-
ticular area, experience was insufficient to establish any sound basis
for change, or the change proposed would conflict with existing
statutory requirements.
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More important among these issues were proposals that would broaden the
scope of negotiations and negotiated grievance procedures and provide some
flexibility to the parties in resolution of impasses.
Further, the Council did not comment on the efficiency or substance of case-
handling by the Assistant Secretary of Labor or the Council itself. Yet the
Assistant Secretary of Labor had issued over 100 decisions and rulings by
August 31, 1971, and the Council had issued a small number of decisions on
negbtiability questions.
In summary, the Council has said that the Order has greatly enhanced the
climate for collective bargaining. Apparently, it believes that the time is not
ripe for legislation and that, absent legislation, the Executive Branch should
retain unilateral control of all fundamental decisions affecting the federal work
force.
Developments in Case Handling
At this point, a brief review of Council decisions on negotiability issues is
appropriate. The decisions of the Assistant Secretary seem less critical in terms
of policy. Interested persons can obtain information on his decisions from a
recently published Digest and Index.9"
The Council has found that a union proposal for an agreement to be subject
to Department of Defense Regulations, but not Army or Command policies is
non-negotiable, because it violates Section 12 of the Order."1 A proposal for
arbitration that would embrace ". . . any policy, regulation, or practice now
or hereinafter enforced wherein the employer has discretion. . ." is non-
negotiable because Sections 13 and 14 of Executive Order No. 11,491 limited
arbitration to the interpretation and application of the agreement." It would
seem that the Council might have found the proposal negotiable on the grounds
that it did not exceed the Section 14 limitations that arbitration may not ex-
tend to "changes or proposed changes in agreements or agency policy." After
obtaining an interpretation of a regulation from the Civil Service Commission,
it was found that an agency may impose higher standards than the regulation,
and a union proposal to lower the standard to that expressed in the Commission
regulation is non-negotiable because of Section 12, Executive Order No.
11,491.11 In another case, where the parties had negotiated procedures for
93. DIGEST AND INDEX.
94. Federal Labor Relations Council No. 70 A-9 [hereinafter cited as FLRC], summarized in
392 G.E.R.R. A-12 (Mar. 15, 1971).
95. FLRC No. 70 A-I , summarized in 392 G.E.R.R. A-12 (Mar. 15, 1971).
96. FLRC No. 70 A-5, summarized in 401 F.E.R.R. A-4 (May 17, 1971).
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determining how employees would be assigned to shifts, the agency decided to
eliminate a shift. The union proposed to negotiate. Because it would impinge
on management's right to set tours of duty as specified in Section 1 (b), it was
decided that changes in shifts or work-week assignments are non-negotiable. 97
In this connection, Arbitrator Morris L. Myers found a Navy shipyard in
violation of its regulations and the agreement, when it changed the work-week
of several employees without consulting the union. He construed the Council
decision as saying that a union cannot compel an agency to bargain on a
proposal that it cannot establish new or different tours of duty unless agreed
upon by the union. In his opinion the Council did not say that the union cannot
contractually require consultation before the decision, nor that an agency regu-
lation imposing such a requirement to consult is invalid under the Order. If
Navy had consulted them, there would have been no restriction on making the
change.9" Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of Labor found the Veterans Ad-
ministration had committed an unfair labor practice in changing tours of duty
without the required consultation.9 The Council found a union proposal to
bargain on the maintenance of a surveillance road a negotiable item. It held
that neither Section 1 1(b) nor Section 12 bars bargaining on a standard for
health and safety.' °°
Progress and Problems
In reaching conclusions on the status of the federal labor relations program,
it is helpful to first consider a few reports and comments published both before
and subsequent to the latest amendments to the Order.
The Federal Bar Council's Committee on Labor Law issued a report on the
federal program in February 1971.10' This is an organization of attorneys from
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The federal program was found to
have a number of weaknesses when compared to developments at state level.
The defects noted were: (1) the absence of judicial review; (2) administration
of the program by managerial officials, serving at the pleasure of the President;
(3) unduly severe strike sanctions; and, (4) limited scope of negotiations.
In its review of operations of the federal program, the Committee on Federal
Government Employee Relations (CFGER) of the American Bar Association
97. FLRC No. 71 A-Il, summarized in 412 G.E.R.R. A-6 (Aug. 2, 1971).
98. In re Arbitration between Mare Island Naval Shipyard and AFL-CIO, 419 G.E.R.R. 151
(Sept. 20, 1971).
99. DIGEST AND INDEX 118.
100. FLRC No. 70 A-10, summarized in 398 G.E.R.R. A-7 (Apr. 26, 1971).
101. 387 G.E.R.R. A-4 (Feb. 8, 1971).
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declared that the postal and air controller strikes demonstrated the need for
more concentration on the cause and prevention of strikes in the federal serv-
ice.' It recommended a review of the deterrent and penalty effects of the
existing no-strike legislation which should consider whether the law provides a
real deterrent and whether present penalties are relevant to the times. Because
federal labor-management relations has problems peculiar to it, the CFGER
felt the best approach to administration would be to statutorily establish a
Federal Labor Relations Board similar to the NLRB. It did not consider the
present form of the Council a satisfactory solution stating that:
The most valid criticisms of this structure are part-time service; lack
of term appointment; and potential conflict with institutional res-
ponsibilities of their regular offices. 03
Immediate comments of federal union representatives on the amendments
to Executive Order No. 11,491 were negative.' At the Second Bi-National
Conference on Collective Bargaining in Federal Public Service it was pointed
out that, under the Canadian Public Service Staff Relations Act, the scope of
union rights and bargaining exceeds the pattern obtained in the United States
Postal Service. Vice-President Thomas R. Donahue of the Service Employees
Union, and a former Assistant Secretary of Labor, reviewed the United States
program. 05 Under the Executive Order, Donahue maintained, the United
States had developed an elaborate framework for federal employee relations,
but had hedged in the bargainers, thus creating more frustration and less
bargaining than under many simpler systems. Further, he asserted, the amend-
ments to Executive Order No. 11,491 were essentially tinkering, which did little
or nothing to improve the reality of bargaining or to relieve union frustrations.
These comments are valid criticisms. The initial Executive Order granted
basic union recognition, spurred organization, created a climate for coopera-
tion, and served to influence both state and local legislatures. Executive Order
No. 11,491 and its amendments established reasonably efficient machinery for
a system, but provided little substance. The federal system, at this time, is not
equivalent to that in many states.
Under these circumstances, labor relations under Executive Order must be
considered experimental and to represent a period of transition from a unilat-
eral merit system to one founded on the process of collective bargaining. Legis-
lation offers the means for this goal and, after ten years of experiment, should
102. 2 ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAWS, 1971 COMMITTEE REPORTS 166 (1971).
103. Id. at 168-69.
104. 417 G.E.R.R. A-12 (Sept. 6, 1971).
105. 424 G.E.R.R. A-2 to A-6 (October 25, 1971).
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be enacted as soon as possible.'
III. Proposals For The Future
Since legislation is the next essential step, attention should be directed to the
methods, goals, principles, and systems involved in its formulation and enact-
ment. It may well set the direction and organization of not only federal labor-
management relations, but federal personnel management for many years
ahead. No one interested group should dominate the statutory process.
The direction of the effort could follow the thought expressed by Civil Serv-
ice Chairman Hampton in testimony before Congress. After stating that there
was no objection in principle to legislation, Mr. Hampton concluded that
I want to emphasize our strong belief in developing a system of
labor relations uniquely designed for the Federal scene; not bor-
rowed from the private sector and not based on provisions of the
Postal Reform Act. We can learn from both, but should be bound
by neither. 107
It is suggested that Congress seek agreement with the Executive Branch and
appoint a commission to make a comprehensive and searching study of federal
personnel management including labor relations and submit recommendations
for legislation. The commission should include representatives of labor and
management but needs a heavy leavening of public members. The proposals
that follow identify some of the key issues that should receive consideration.
Organization for Labor Relations
"Responsibility for the administration of public employment relations policies
should be placed in an independent agency. It should be a legislative creation
with the legislature retaining only budgetary control through its constitutional
power over appropriations.""'
106. "Federal employees should be accorded the right to collective bargaining by enactment
of a federal law. A succession of Executive Orders has opened the way for giving federal employees
access to the full measure of bargaining advocated in this Assembly report in other levels of
government. A federal law would protect and broaden these employee rights and not leave them
to the discretion of a chief executive and would spell out employer rights as well." FOURTEENTH
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1971).
107. 394 G.E.R.R. A-I (Mar. 29, 1971).
108. PICKETS AT CITY HALL 27. It is interesting to note that the National Association of
Manufacturers recommends where legislation is necessary it should include provisions for an
independent agency to administer labor-management relations. It would limit jurisdiction to the
determination of appropriate units and questions involving representation, certification, and decer-
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This recommendation was directed to state and local government units. It
applies equally to the federal scene. Until Congress enacts labor-management
relations policies and establishes an agency with the powers to carry out the
policies, labor-management relations are in the discretion of the executive,
inherently limited, fragmented, and subject to crisis manipulation.
Such an agency cannot be set up in a vacuum. Its purpose, powers, and
organization must be reconciled with the existing structure of government.
Developing a comprehensive plan and organization will also require changes
in the present structure. The need for institutional reform in federal personnel
management encompasses and precedes the problem of incorporating the
collective bargaining process into the system.109
In the Pendleton Act of 1883, establishing the Civil Service Commission as
an independent agency, Congress created the base for federal personnel man-
agement. In that Act, Congress provided by law for general policies, leaving
detailed civil service rules to the President. The Commission was legally re-
sponsible to the President, but independent in its function as the guardian of
the merit system. The primary goal of Congress, the public, and the early
Commissioners was simply reform. Efficiency was subordinate to elimination
of the spoils system."'
Since the 1930's, the federal government has become the largest single em-
ployer in the United States. The personnel needs of this vast Civil Service have
outstripped the political spoilsmen, so that patronage is not a fundamental
problem. The problem has been recognized and received the attention of all
Presidents since Herbert Hoover. Various committees and boards have
recommended substantive changes, and bills have been introduced, but Con-
gress has not been receptive to this goal."' The reports usually noted that the
Commission was serving two masters and two objectives. In 1958 and 1959,
Senator Clark of Pennsylvania introduced legislation that would have sepa-
rated the Civil Service Commission into two agencies, one concerned with
appellate functions and protection of the merit system, the other serving as a
central personnel agency responsible directly to the President.
tification, leaving unfair labor practices to the courts. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NAM REPORTS 18 (1970).
109. Hall, The U.S. Civil Service Commission, Arm of the President?, 28 PUB. PERSONNEL
REV. 114 (1967).
110. See P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE (1958).
Il1. Hall, supra note 109; REEVES & DAVID, PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE (1937); THE COMMISSION
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1949); COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECU-
TIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE, H.R. Doc. No.
89, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955).
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At the hearings, the proposed legislation drew strong support from students
of public administration. Representatives of the Administration and federal
employee unions testified in opposition."' The proposals did not survive. Dr.
Wilson Hart has observed that Administration opposition was based on the
contention that the Civil Service Commission was the personnel arm of the
President, while the union leaders feared that the repeal of the Civil Service
Act could mean the return of the spoils system." 3
President Nixon recognized the need for more effective personnel leadership
in his Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 when he established the Office of
Management and Budget and assigned it responsibilities in the area of execu-
tive management. Similarly, the National Civil Service League in publishing a
new "Model Public Personnel Administration Law" was cognizant of this
fundamental problem. It noted that "[j]ust as in the late 1800's, and early
1900's the reformers who led the National Civil Service League in helping to
bring about the famous Pendleton Act needed a law to help fight the battle
against problems of that day, contemporary reformers need a new law to help
wage the battle against today's problems . . . ." The League recommended
continuation of public personnel management founded on merit principles, but
operated by a personnel director, who would report to and serve at the pleasure
of the chief executive. In addition, there would be a citizen personnel advisory
board appointed by the chief executive and confirmed by the legislature. The
board's principal functions would be advice and counsel on all aspects of public
personnel administration."'
Proposal
Legislation, transferring the personnel management functions of the Civil Serv-
ice Commission to the Executive Office of the President and consolidating its
appellate and watch-dog functions with labor management relations under a
separate independent agency responsible to Congress, is appropriate and re-
sponsive to the public interest.
112. Hearings on S. 3888,. U.S. Post Office and Civil Service Comm., U.S. Senate (1958), S.
1638 (1959).
113. W. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 241-53 (1961). Hart
discusses the belief prior to 1960, of the Federal employee unions that executive personnel discre-
tion should be controlled by laws prescribing detailed procedures, with a completely independent
Commission enforcing these laws. He suggested that when collective bargaining becomes the
accepted system for union activity, the unions would support legislation granting more discretion-
ary authority to the executive.
114. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, A MODEL PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION LAW
(1970).
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Scope of Bargaining
In this area, the federal program has not given adequate voice to its employees.
In proposing legislation, an initial consideration must be the degree of control
over personnel administration which Congress will release."' The subjects of
pay, insurance, health benefits, retirement, hours of duty, and leave are under
complete legislative control. The legislature cannot, in terms of order and
responsibility, bargain with special interest groups, even those representing
federal employees. No union, or group of unions, speaks in a meaningful
manner for the majority of federal employees. Consequently, lobbying by em-
ployee representatives has been employed to influence legislation. Yet the Post
Office strike brought about bargaining between the unions and Executive
Branch officials with tacit Congressional approval and consequent legislation
on pay which affirmed negotiated agreements.
There is a joint labor-management system covering wage board employees.
Also the Federal Comparability Pay Act of 1970 set up a council of unions to
assist and advise in the annual salary review.
Proposal
Systems of formalized consultation with joint labor-management recommen-
dations to Congress for final action are a necessary supplement to collective
bargaining in the Executive Branch.
Issuance of unilateral regulations by the President, the Civil Service Commis-
sion, and the agencies of the Executive Branch has also circumscribed the
bargaining process. Obviously, as with actions by Congress, there is no labor
group responsible to a majority of government employees so as to represent
them in bargaining at the level of Civil Service rule-making. Similar problems
exist at agency level in most departments.
Proposal
In adopting government-wide personnel regulations, consultation with repre-
sentatives of agencies and labor organizations should be required by law."6
115. See 0. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 248 (5th ed. 1962). Dr. Stahl sug-
gests that the success of collective bargaining in public employment may well depend on the extent
of legislative delegation of personnel matters to executive agencies.
116. See REEVES & DAVID, supra note I 1l, at 97. The Civil Service Commission does consult
with both agencies and unions in developing policies and procedures. But the Commission does
not view this practice as a legal requirement. This 1937 study recommended such a requirement.
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At agency level, amended Executive Order No. 11,491 requires consultation
with any union holding national consultation rights or negotiation with a labor
organization holding national exclusive recognition. Although not yet thor-
oughly tested, these provisions are directed at the problem. Details for such
arrangements could well be left to the discretion of the proposed independent
agency.
In addition to the areas of bargaining under the control of Congress and
those surrogated by the continuance of unilateral executive regulation, there
are limitations arising out of long established concepts cherished by the public
administrator. These include sovereignty, "the public interest," the contention
that there are essential differences in public employment versus employment
in the private sector, and the preservation of the merit system. Such concepts
require that broad and detailed management rights provisions be set by statute
or executive fiat and not left to the vagaries of collective bargaining. This
approach leads to centralized authority, recognition of large units for bargain-
ing, and leaves little to discuss at the local bargaining table.
At the federal level, the events of the 1960's have laid to rest the notion that
a sovereign government cannot engage in collective bargaining with its employ-
ees." 7 But under the guise of public interest, the substantive content of bargain-
ing has been circumscribed. Obviously, personnel management in the federal
service must be directed in the public interest. Ultimate authority rests in the
legislature. Executive Branch leadership operates under the mandate of the
Constitution and laws. It has responsibility to promulgate broad rules. The
courts are the final overseers of the constitutional propriety of the laws and the
rules, as well as the reviewers of executive action. The American system will
not accept the proposal that the civil servant should "attempt the domination
of the service to which he belongs.""' But the viability of the political system
does not require the belief that unilateral regulations at various levels of agency
organization are, or should be, wholly beyond the reach of collective negotia-
tions. The latter assertion promotes an image similar to the situation in private
sector bargaining which prompted the observation of Reder that the phrase,
"public interest," is a symbol to legitimize the commands of an elected official
as to the terms of the bargain."'
117. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A COMMISSION RE-
PORT, LABOR MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 54-56 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS]. Views on
sovereignty and its impact on public employee labor relations are discussed. See also Nigro, The
Implications for Public Administration, 28 PUB. AD. REV. 137-42 (1968).
118. H. LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE 337 (1927).
119. M. REDER, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WAGE SETTLEMENTS, IN FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGINING 155 (J.T. Dunlop & N.W. Chamberlain eds. 1967). See also Higgins, Public Interest,
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The widely accepted view that there are essential differences between private
and public employment has allowed general endorsement of collective bargain-
ing for federal employees, but with considerable caution and reluctance in
determining the subject matter that could be entrusted to bilateral determina-
tion. The differences that exist may not require such cautious treatment. 20
Wellington and Winter concluded that the claims for collective bargaining in
the private sector-that it was a way to industrial peace and democracy, and
that the unions also represented their members politically-were valid claims
to warrant collective bargaining for public employees. They also concluded that
the social costs of bargaining in the private sector are principally economic and
inherently limited by market forces, whereas in the public sector the costs are
largely political.' 2' The evidence does not suggest the differences are of a kind
that law or regulation should authorize agency managers or the Executive
Branch to segregate a large body of significant issues from collective bargaining
channels.
Since 1961, the official view of the Executive Branch has been that there is
no incompatibility between the existing merit system and collective bargaining.
There is considerable disagreement with this proposition. It seems clear that a
merit system-originating in law, including regulations of the Civil Service
Commission, and supplementing agency rules-must limit collective bargain-
ing. Some officials contend that the two systems are incompatible. Others are
of the opinion that, although a degree of conflict exists, it is not such as to
preclude the accommodation of the systems to each other.1
22
It is also necessary to distinguish between a merit system and the merit
The Catholic Standard (Washington, D.C.), March 6, 1969, at 9, col. 1. Stating that responsible
labor leaders in the field of public employment readily admit that public service employees should
be conscientiously concerned about the public interest, Msgr. Higgins continues, ". . . but they
tend to become very irate-and quite understandably so, in my opinion-when the public interest
concept, 'waved like a banner when there is a confrontation between public employees, is used to
prejudice the community against the cause of the public employee even though the employee is,
himself, part of that tax-paying service-using public.'"
120. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATION, supra note 113, at 52. Cit-
ing the views of John W. Macy, Jr., that government service is essentially different from private
employment, but that this should not limit the role of labor unions, and that the test of labor's
success should not be whether the forms and techniques of collective bargaining, in the private
sector, are reached, but whether similar results for the workers are achieved.
121. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78
YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
122. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 77-78;
Camp & Lomax, Bilateralism and The Merit Principle, Pun. AM. REV. 132-37 (1968). But see 370
G.E.R.R. B-4 (Oct. 12, 1970). William J. Kilberg suggests that the Civil Service system is a ". ..
major stumbling block to free collective bargaining..." and supports the idea that ". . . all non-
merit functions should be removed from the Civil Service Commission and placed under a labor
relations officer ....
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principle. The latter presumes that public employment requires the hiring,
utilization, and separation of employees on the basis of qualifications without
improper discrimination and in accordance with procedural and substantive
equity. It was conceived to minimize the effect of patronage. The former is the
particular system of laws, regulations, and organizational structure, designed
to achieve the fulfillment of the merit principle.
The merit systems in public employment generally have been unilaterally
developed. Much of the resistance to increasing the scope of bargaining in the
federal service may be centered in the reluctance of managers to share this rule-
making authority. Yet there seems to be no inherent defect in bilateral decision-
making that should endanger the merit principle.
Unions and managers will never completely agree on the application of the
merit principle. The Union's traditional reliance on seniority as merit in many
situations is at variance with the administrator's concept supported by research
that "really good workers perform far better than those who simply meet
minimum standards."'' On the other hand, individual managers have often
worked within merit systems to find solutions to problems which met their
specific definition of merit. One commentator suggests that union activity is
reducing the scope of unilateral decision-making and that "management is
becoming more careful, more responsible, and more responsive." At this time
he views the relationship between unions and merit systems as dynamic and
unstable.'
Viewed in this context, the strong management rights provisions of Executive
Order No. 10,988 were expressions of genuine concern on the part of those
federal officials who were introducing a form of collective bargaining into the
federal service. The unions discovered early that these provisions, when fol-
lowed literally, left few areas for bargaining. In many instances, bargaining
became a process of redefining and eroding the management rights language.
Many negotiated agreements contained provisions qualifying or implementing
procedures concerning subjects supposedly under the exclusive discretion of
management.1 5
When revisions in federal programs which resulted in Executive Order No.
11,491 were being considered, the unions were advocating that negotiations
should be permitted on any subject not prohibited by law. This would have
made many Civil Service Commission and agency regulations susceptible to
123. Nigro, supra note 117, at 144.
124. Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?, PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 109, 113
(1970).
125. See DEP'T oi LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 1451, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE FEDERAl. SERVICE (1965).
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amendment by collective bargaining. Apparently those who prepared Executive
Order No. 11,491 were persuaded by the differences in federal and private
employment, the need to protect the merit system against encroachment, and
the contentions of agency managers that the public interest and the laws of
Congress required specific executive action preserving managerial prerogatives.
Despite the fact that evidence indicates similar arguments were originally made
by managers in the private sector, this approach has been accepted by other
public authorities." 6
In terms of practical labor relations, management rights can ordinarily be
protected by negotiation. The particular needs in a federal program are that
"there must be a clear line of communication between the actual participants
and that body or official with final authority to accept and implement agree-
ments reached in negotiations" and an understanding that negotiations cannot
extend beyond the employer-agency's authority to make binding commit-
ments.'27
Proposals
Identification of the basic management prerogatives which, in the public inter-
est, should be retained by government officials, is a necessary preliminary step
to legislation. Other than the legislated prerogatives, a requirement that areas
for unilateral management decision should be subject to negotiation is condu-
cive to meaningful bargaining.
The limitation of the scope of bargaining by agency rule-making, at adminis-
trative levels above the parties to negotiation, extends to many employment
practices and conditions beyond those excluded as managerial prerogatives.
Detailed agency regulations impede the development of the bargaining process
at lower levels of the organization, especially at the local installation. The vast
majority of federal employees report daily to offices and shops scattered
throughout the country. To them, the government is at that place. Washington
is a nebulous entity of loosely identified persons and institutions, having little
to do with their daily activities at or away from the work place. They have
joined unions for the same reasons as their neighbors in private industry.
"Unionism springs from the basic aspirations of wage earners who become
convinced that they can get more satisfaction by membership in a union than
by doing it alone."'2 8 With government approval of collective bargaining for
126. Chamberlain, supra note 71. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, supra note 117, at 79, 102; PICKETS AT CITY HALL 13.
127. PICKETS AT CITY HALL 14-15.
128. P. RIGORS & C. MEYERS, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 94 (4th ed. 1961), cited by 0.
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its employees, union membership has soared. Expectations were heightened,
and, one might expect, motivation and attitudes improved. But when agree-
ments are frustrated by unknown officials and expected subjects of negotiation
shut off by agency regulations, the benefits of collective bargining are aborted.
Executive Branch officials in endorsing a system of collective bargaining ob-
viously accept the view that "collective bargaining performs functions that are
indispensable to the maintenance of a humane industrial society. It secures,
above all, the worker's commitment to political democracy and a free enter-
prise economy."' 29 The regulatory framework should implement this view.
Proposal
If collective bargaining for federal employees is to accomplish its objectives, a
proviso is necessary that, unless precluded by law, government-wide regulation,
or the terms of a controlling agreement at a higher agency level, terms of a
negotiated agreement should prevail over agency regulation.
Union Security
Legal and political factors apparently guided the framers of both Executive
Order No. 10,988 and Executive Order No. 11,491 in excluding union security
mechanisms such as the union or agency shop from the federal labor-
management relations program. While the legal factors would not seem to
inhibit Congress,' 3 the political factors could well be an obstacle to any Con-
gressional action permitting union security clauses to be freely negotiated.
Opposition to union provisions in public employment is led by the National
Right-to-Work Committee "which calls itself a single-purpose citizens 'asso-
ciation' opposed to union security arrangements, including the union shop,
agency shop, and maintenance of membership clauses .... " The Commit-
tee espouses voluntary unionism in both the public and private sectors. Other
opponents see a conflict with the merit principle, claiming that a requirement
of union membership has no place in a system where employment should be
STAHL, supra note 115, at 223. See also K. WARNER, CLIMATE FOR COOPERATION, IN MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS WITH ORGANIZED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (K. Warner ed. 1963).
129. Macdonald, Collective Bargaining in the Post War Period, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
577 (1967). See also A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 195 (1962).
130. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 556 (1957). Sullivan, The Supreme Court and Public
Employee Collective Bargaining, 35 TENN. L. REV. 452, 456 (1968). In discussing the impact of
this case on public employment the author says, "... (tlhe Court in this decision has made it
possible for a union shop to exist."
131. 347 G.E.R.R. A-6 (May 4, 1970).
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determined solely on a basis of merit. 132
The principal arguments in favor of union security provisions are threefold:
first, such agreements contribute to stable labor relations; second, they elimi-
nate the inequity arising from the non-member enjoying the benefits of union
action but not paying for the services; and, third, since unions are denied the
right to strike, the public employer should grant some type of union secu-
rity. 33
The final argument does not seem particularly cogent. The political realities
also indicate that stability in labor relations is, perhaps, too abstract a concept
to overcome the principle of voluntary unionism. However, the "agency shop,"
which permits an employee to refrain from membership but requires him to
pay for representational services, is a reasonable solution. The Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations, after strongly endorsing the right of
an employee to refrain from joining a union, suggests this mechanism.' 3 Nor
does such an arrangement seem incompatible with the federal merit system.
But the Congress has not yet indicated it will support an agency shop for federal
employees.' m
Proposal
Provisions, retaining for federal employees the right to join or not to join a
union, but authorizing arrangements requiring the regular payment of repre-
sentational fees by employees in a unit, would avoid compulsory unionism and
yet would deal with the patent inequity presented by the "free rider."
Procedures
The federal experience, with a truncated form of collective bargaining under
Executive Order No. 10,988, provided the President's Review Committee with
considerable insight into operating problems. The resulting Executive Order
No. 11,491 consequently set forth a procedural framework that merits consid-
erable attention from those who may be involved in federal labor-management
legislative proposals. Although one may be critical of the limitations on the
132. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 76.
133. Id. at 76.
134. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 94; 424
G.E.R.R. B-5 (Oct. 25, 1971). The Advisory Commission revised Model Public Employee Rela-
tions Law includes the agency shop.
135. 357 G.E.R.R. A-3 (July 13, 1970). Congressman David N. Henderson successfully urged
House members of Conference Committee on the Postal Reform Act to eliminate provisions
allowing negotiation of the union shop.
19721
Catholic University Law Review
substance of bargaining, the system established in the Order gave necessary
protection to the public interest; adopted more firmly the essential principle of
exclusive recognition; clarified the role of the supervisor; provided mechanisms
for the handling of representation questions, grievances, and unfair labor prac-
tices; imposed reasonable standards on union leadership; set up machinery for
handling negotiation impasses; and formed an organization to administer the
program.
There is, however, a tendency of a central body towards arbitrary control of
procedures, especially in areas where there seems to be a lack of confidence in
the ability of managers to find the preferred solution. In the federal program,
it is evinced through provisions for mandatory representation elections, addi-
tional criteria for determining the appropriate unit, the requirement for "off-
the-clock" bargaining, the mandatory inclusion of a grievance procedure in all
negotiated contracts, and the prohibition against any voluntary third-party
arrangements to resolve impasses. Also, the Council decisions on negotiability
lead one to believe that bargaining would be less inhibited if such questions
were resolved through unfair labor practice complaint, citing a refusal to bar-
gain, as in the private sector.'
Proposal
Examination of the principles of Executive Order 11,491 and thorough consid-
eration of its procedures should constitute a major part in the formulation of
legislation.
In view of the continued pressures for compulsory arbitration of bargaining
impasses, the processes for settlement enunciated in Executive Order No.
11,491 deserve special attention. Under the Order, mediation is freely avail-
able. Fact finding with recommendations can be authorized by the Federal
Service Impasses Panel, and, if the dispute is not resolved, the Panel may take
necessary action to settle the dispute. Unfortunately, the parties are not free
to develop their own third party procedures. In rare circumstances, binding
arbitration might be considered the necessary action for resolution.
Compulsory arbitration amounts to an automatic referral of the issues caus-
ing an impasse to a third party for binding determination.' In the private
sector, labor and management have generally opposed compulsory arbitration
as destructive of bargaining and an unwise delegation of authority to less than
136. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
137. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 82. The
report reviews the use of compulsory arbitration and summarizes opposing views of its effective-
ness.
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omniscient third parties. It is rejected as a process which undermines private
decision-making.' Those advocating the system for use in the public sector
believe that the absence of the right to strike, for public employees, requires a
substitute to provide balance in the bargaining process and that final resolution
of impasses by an impartial third party accomplishes this purpose.
In the public sector, opponents argue that compulsory arbitration is a ques-
tionably constitutional delegation of sovereign authority, a corruption of the
bargaining process, and an unrealistic concept in that a third party is expected
to have the necessary detachment, impartiality, and expertise to arrive at mu-
tually satisfactory solutions. 139
Putting aside the questions of unwise or unconstitutional delegation and the
competence of third parties, it is clear that ready access to binding arbitration
undermines the joint decision-making envisioned in collective bargaining.
There is no compulsion to compromise conflicting claims when either side
knows there is another available forum. " " It is equally clear that impasses will
arise in negotiations. Absent resolution machinery and the right to strike, the
union is in an untenable position, possibly finding relief only through an illegal
strike.
The procedures provided in Executive Order No. 11,491 properly do not
include compulsory arbitration. They are responsive to the needs of the parties
to have third-party assistance; there is no broad delegation of governmental
powers to persons not in government service; pressure is maintained on the
bargaining parties; and, if necessary, binding arbitration is available as a possi-
ble terminal process. This kind of system is essential to preserve both the public
interest and the collective bargaining process. At the same time it should
minimize the threat of occurrence of strikes. 4'
Proposal
To achieve viable collective bargaining, the proposed Labor Relations Agency
138. Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 617, 632
(1967).
139. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 83.
140. A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 56, at 73-74, excerpt of remarks of Harold
S. Roberts; 377 G.E.R.R. B-I (Nov. 30, 1970). William R. Word suggests arbitration in which
the arbitrator has only the authority to choose the proposal of either management or labor. He
cites Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?, 2 INDUS. REL.
J. 38-52 (1966).
141. For similar conclusions as to the need for third-party procedures to avoid both strikes
and compulsory arbitration see: PICKETS AT CITY HALL 20-24; ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 106-07; A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 56, at 47-49, excerpt of remarks by George W. Taylor.
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should be empowered to promulgate and utilize procedures for resolving nego-
tiation impasses, including, but not limited to mediation, third-party fact find-
ing with recommendations and, when necessary for final resolution, some form
of binding arbitration.
Strikes
One may have believed that the development and implementation of sound
labor-management programs for federal and other public employees would
have made the issue of public employee strikes a peripheral consideration. This
belief could once have been based on the widepsread concept that nobody could
or would strike against the government,' or that neither legislators nor the
courts had sanctioned public employee strikes, and, apparently, public employ-
ees were satisfied with the status quo. 43 Any relevancy once attributed to such
beliefs has disappeared with the increasingly successful use of the strike weapon
by public employees.'" Strikes by federal employees and a search for means
of dealing with concerted work stoppages are now vitally important issues in
any review of the labor-management programs. " 5
Prior to 1947, there was no statute explicitly barring federal employees'
strikes. The government depended on various laws which indirectly limited the
right to strike and acted as if it had some inherent right to bar strikes., In
1947, a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act made these strikes unlawful, and, in
1955, a considerably stronger law was enacted which makes participation in a
strike a felony.4 7
Federal employee strikes had occurred occasionally before the passage of
these laws, increasing in frequency in the temporary, depression-oriented agen-
cies of the 1930's. s4 After passage of the anti-strike acts, the federal work force
was quiescent until the 1960's while the incidence of public employee strikes
at state and local levels multiplied. Even in the 1960's, federal employee strikes
have constituted a very small percentage of public employee strikes.' Ob-
142. Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike Question, 28 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 128-29 (1968).
143. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 59.
144. Id. See also Nesvig, supra note 142, at 131.
145. 116 CONG. REC. S4698 (daily ed. March 31, 1970) (remarks of Senator Goldwater), "I
think it is past time that the Congress conduct hearings to look into the problems involved relative
to the complaints of the works and to, at the same time, reassess the position of the Federal
Government that it is illegal to strike against the Government, which in effect is striking against
the people."
146. S. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 16-19 (1948).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 188 (1947). 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1955).
148. SPERO, supra note 146, at 14.
149. PICKETS AT CITY HALL 32.
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viously, the strict anti-strike law was one factor in achieving this record of
relative peace in labor-management relations. Yet, such laws were of little
value in impeding militant action among state and municipal workers. Other
reasons for the federal record have been suggested. These include, a greater
acceptance of unionism by federal officials, the implementation of the Presi-
dential Executive Orders, higher wage and benefit provisions, civil service pro-
tection, a more sophisticated labor and management officialdom, and the suc-
cess of union lobbying efforts s°
There is also a very pragmatic problem to be faced by federal strikers. Since
the economic leverage of the strikers in the private sector is missing, the partic-
ular strike, if it is to be successful, must create direct and significant political
consequences and impact. In the federal government, this requires forcing top
Administration officials and the Congress into a position where the strike
problems and their resolutions are of a high priority. It is only in a most
unusual situation that a large membership can be effectively organized-where
the public sympathies will side with the strikers and where the consequences
directly concern the federal leadership. Such a combination of circumstances
is unlikely to arise in connection with federal hospital workers in Nevada,
tradesmen in Oklahoma, or white-collar employees in Ohio. It did occur in the
recent postal strike.
The effectiveness of the federal anti-strike law, in critical situations, must be
considered somewhat wanting. The propriety of treating a labor dispute as an
attack on authority, when employees strike, is also most questionable.,", Over
the years, the federal employee has shown considerable retraint in his use of
the strike weapon and displayed a working concern for the public interest and
the federal service. 52
Some argue that the right to strike is a natural right, inherent in human
nature, flowing not from the state, but from the dignity and needs of the
employees; that a strike which is legitimate may become wrong so that the right
is not absolute. The government, rather than outlaw all strikes among public
employees, should re-examine its policy and admit the right, but find means
to control it where safety and security is endangered.'
150. Id. at 33.
151. SPERO, supra note 146, at 15.
152. 0. STA HL, supra note 115, at 251.
153. Eamonn Barrett, Strikes In The Public Sector, Panel, Vol. 20, No. 4, Labor Management
School, University of San Francisco (March/April 1970). See also discussion of question in
PICKETS AT CITY HALL 24-26; Nesvig, supra note 142, at 129-32; ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 61-63; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AMERI-
CAN GOVERNMENT, AMERICAN ASSEMBLY 6 (1971). Canada and some states including Hawaii and
Pennsylvania have followed this course.
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Arguments supporting anti-strike laws rest on the concept of sovereignty;
they regard any public employee strike as a challenge to the state, which, if
permitted, may undermine government. Flowing from the sovereignty concept
is the contention that there are basic differences between the public and private
sectors. Strikes in the private sector are subject to the economic restraints
inherent in the situation. Strikes in the public sector, on the other hand, have
political consequences, and the power to withhold labor could give to unions
"a disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision as to
skew the results of the 'normal' American political process. . .. "I The con-
cept of sovereignty is "the right of government, through its laws, to ensure the
survival of the 'normal American political process' . . . strikes by public em-
ployees may, as a long-run proposition, threaten that process ... "I"
Finally, there are many unionists and others who hold that there is no
distinction between public and private employment and that giving government
employees the same rights to strike as those in the private sector is the proper
and practical solution.'
Legislative proposals for a labor-management system must deal with the
strike question.
Proposals
Provisions that strikes generally not be regarded as proper and reasonable
conduct for federal employees and that the right to strike must be circum-
scribed place this issue in perspective as basically a labor-management relations
problem.
Consideration of amendments to the present federal statute which bars all
strikes and treats participations by federal employees in such activity as a
felony is essential to the development of a sound labor-management relations
program.
Methodology
Task Forces or Commissions usually rely on research of literature, consultation
with experts and technicians in the field of study, questionnaires, and hearings.
In view of the size and extent of the federal service, there is a need for factual
154. Wellington & Winter, supra note 121, at 1123.
155. Id. at 1125-26.
156. Bilek, Toward Public Sector Equality: Extending the Strike Privilege, 21 LAB. L.J. 338
(1970); Address by Theodore W. Kheel to the Federal Bar Association Briefing Conference on
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 24, 1969; ADVIsoRY COM-
MITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 117, at 62-63.
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information from all levels of the Executive Branch and from as many geo-
graphical points as possible. There are excellent resources available within the
government which can be utilized. The Civil Service Commission has compe-
tent program evaluation staffs and labor-management specialists in each of its
regional offices. In accordance with the responsibility vested in it by Executive
Order No. 11,491, the Department of Labor also has labor-management spe-
cialists in field offices throughout the country.
Proposal
Use of Department of Labor-Civil Service Commission teams for data-
gathering surveys and for evaluation of program needs at field installations
would give the appointed Commission quick access to basic information not
otherwise available.
Legislation of the extent proposed would bring about a radical change in both
the organization and operation of federal personnel management. These rec-
ommendations are based on a strong belief in both our system of government
and the intrinsic value of the collective bargaining process in a democratic
society, untidy as such a process sometimes is. The present author concurs with
Robert M. Hutchins:
[T]he democratic concept of self-government based upon an
accommodation of conflicting interests through reason and per-
suasion remains perhaps the most potent idea of modern history.
Improved institutional forms provide the best hope for maintain-
ing and furthering the democratic idea . . . if our hopes of demo-
cracy are to be realized, the next generation is in for a job of in-
stitutional remodeling the likes of which has not been since the
Founding Fathers." 7
157. Robert M. Hutchins, Is Democracy Possible? Acceptance speech for the Sydney Hillman
Award (Jan. 21, 1959), cited in Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?, 20 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 617-18 (1967).
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